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SUMMARY 
 
This year sees the end of the EU’s current eight-year Drugs Strategy and second 
four-year action plan. In this report we look to see what the Strategy has achieved, 
and what should come next. 
 
In general, we welcome the practical application by the EU of the principle of 
subsidiarity in this area. We agree with our witnesses that most aspects of drugs 
policies should remain within the competence of the Member States. The role of the 
EU should continue to be to complement, and where possible to strengthen and add 
value to, the actions of Member States. We also welcome the cooperation in this 
area between cities and across national boundaries, and call for this to be increased. 
 
We believe that the European Drugs Strategy has been of value in providing a 
guiding framework within which Member States can formulate their national drug 
policies. In our view, however, previous aims of demand reduction and supply 
reduction have been too broadbrush to be useful as a guide to EU policy 
formulation: they should not therefore be treated as the main objectives of the next 
EU Strategy. Instead, we recommend that the new EU Drugs Strategy should be 
better focused and, while respecting the present division of competences, should 
seek to give a useful sense of direction to national policies. 
 
We suggest that the next Strategy should concentrate on the areas where the EU 
can make a major contribution. 
 
The first of these areas is coordination of the fight against drug trafficking. On the 
legislative front, the EU should better focus on money laundering and strengthen 
provisions on the seizure of the proceeds of crime. On the operational side, through 
Europol and other agencies, it can directly contribute to the fight against drug 
trafficking. And we believe EU aid and EU research programmes should devote more 
resources to crop diversification away from drugs, and to drug related research projects. 
 
The Strategy should also make clear that anti-trafficking measures must guard against 
displacing the problem to countries and regions not previously affected where they can 
cause significant damage to civil society; must have regard to the human rights of those 
involved; and must be subjected to evaluation as demand reduction measures have 
been. We believe that working on these fronts will be more productive than revising 
existing legislation on maximum penalties and newly developed psychoactive substances. 
 
We were impressed by the work of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction, and the regard in which it is held around the world. We therefore 
recommend that any future Strategy should seek to safeguard this agency’s future and 
should continue to encourage the development and improvement of the collection, 
analysis, evaluation and distribution of information on the drugs issue so that Member 
States can learn from each other’s experiences and benefit from each other’s research. 
 
We were struck by the evidence we heard from Portugal on the effectiveness of their 
public health orientated national drug strategy. We therefore recommend that the 
new Strategy should use the EU’s public health obligations to encourage the 
inclusion of harm reduction measures in the national policies of the Member States. 
It should be recognised that health policy is as important as law enforcement policy 
in this field and that education also has a significant role to play. 
 
Finally, we believe that the formulation and adoption of a new Drugs Strategy 
offers a golden opportunity to widen the public debate, to consider as 
dispassionately as possible the different policies and approaches and to narrow the 
gap between theory and practice, and thus to achieve a better consensus about the 
best way of proceeding. We urge the EU institutions, in particular the Commission 
and the Parliament, to make sure that this takes place. 

The EU Drugs Strategy 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. In 2009 there were 7,600 drug-induced deaths from overdoses in the 
Member States of the European Union, three quarters of them from heroin, 
and perhaps twice as many drug-related deaths from HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, 
violence, suicide, trauma and chronic health problems caused by repeated 
use of drugs. 78 million adults—23% of European adults—had used 
cannabis at some time in their lives, 12 million of them in the last month. 
Between 1.3 and 1.4 million Europeans are problem users of heroin.1 Public 
expenditure on the drugs problem in the EU in 2008 was estimated at €34 
billion.2 
2. It is instructive to compare illegal narcotic drugs with two psychoactive drugs 
which are legal and openly commercially available: alcohol and tobacco. 
Worldwide, one person in three uses alcohol, one in four uses tobacco, 
whereas fewer than 5% of people declare themselves as using drugs at least 
once a year, and fewer than 1% use drugs on a continuing basis. Tobacco 
kills five million people a year, alcohol 2.5 million people a year, and drugs 
about 500,000 a year.3 These are figures that need to be borne in mind when 
considering why some potentially harmful addictive substances are licit and 
some illicit. Prescribed drugs, whether or not mixed with narcotic drugs, also 
lead to acute cases of addiction and withdrawal, but they too are outside the 
scope of our inquiry and are not examined in this report. 
3. We do not need to stress the harm caused by drugs, not just to the users 
themselves, but to their families, their communities, and society at large. It is 
not surprising that it raises strong emotions and arguments. Any examination 
of drugs related issues needs to be conducted dispassionately, and opinions 
need to be based on well-founded evidence. This is what we have 
endeavoured to do in the course of this inquiry. 
4. Nowhere is this more important than in any discussion of decriminalisation. 
It should hardly need to be said that what is at issue is whether the 
possession of small quantities of narcotic drugs for personal use, and the use 
of those drugs, is best dealt with as a criminal offence punished by criminal 
sanctions, or whether it should be dealt with in some other way. It is not to 
our knowledge being suggested that drug trafficking—taking advantage of the 
weaknesses of others for financial gain—should be other than a serious 
criminal offence. Yet too often discussion of decriminalisation is portrayed as 
an attempt to suggest that drug trafficking should not be a criminal offence. 
The fact that we need to stress this point at the outset of our report shows 
the unfortunate way in which this debate is sometimes conducted.4 
                                                                                                                                  
1 EMCDDA annual report 2011, and EMCDDA Selected Issue 2011: Mortality related to drug use in Europe: 
public health implications. Most EMCDDA statistics include figures from Norway, which takes part in its 
activities, but this does not affect the validity of comparisons between the Member States within the EU, or 
between the EU and other States. 
2 EMCDDA report Towards a better understanding of drug related expenditure in Europe, 2008. The report 
highlights the difficulties of making such estimates, but assesses that the 95% confidence interval is €28 
billion to €40 billion. 
3 UNODC 2009 World Drug Report; Antonio Mario Costa, former Executive Director of UNODC, QQ 155 
and 158 
4 We examine this further in Chapter 5. 
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5. We explain in the following chapter the gradually increasing involvement of 
the EU in combating drugs problems. This year sees the end of the current 
EU Drugs Strategy 2005–2012. In June 2010, shortly after it was re-
appointed at the beginning of this Parliament, our Home Affairs Sub-
Committee decided that the autumn of 2011 would be a good time to 
conduct an inquiry to consider what has been achieved in the past and what 
should come next. The Committee, whose members are listed in 
Appendix 1, confirmed this decision in June 2011. The following month a 
call for written evidence was issued; this is published in Appendix 3. Such 
evidence was received from 7 persons and bodies. Between October and 
December 2011 the Sub-Committee held twelve oral evidence sessions and 
heard from 24 witnesses, a number of whom submitted supplementary 
written evidence. They are listed in Appendix 2. 
6. At the end of November 2011 the Sub-Committee visited Brussels, where we 
took evidence from Vice-President Viviane Reding, the Commissioner 
responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, and whose 
responsibility includes the EU Drug Strategy, and also from José Sócrates, 
the former Prime Minister of Portugal who was responsible for the major 
change in the direction of his country’s drugs policy which we describe in 
Chapter 5. The following day we flew to Lisbon where we visited the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 
and took further evidence. We are most grateful to all those who gave us 
written and oral evidence, and particularly grateful to the Director and 
officials of the EMCDDA for their help and their hospitality. 
7. Throughout the course of this inquiry we have been fortunate to have as our 
specialist adviser Dr Caroline Chatwin, Lecturer in Criminology, School of 
Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, University of Kent. We are 
most grateful for her expert knowledge, her guidance and her valuable 
contribution to this report. 
8. We make this report to the House for debate. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL, NATIONAL AND 
LOCAL BACKGROUND 
9. This report inevitably focuses on the drugs strategies and policies of the EU 
and its Member States, but it has to be remembered that this is also both a 
global and a local problem. Heroin finds its way from Afghanistan to Europe 
mainly through the Balkan route (Iran, Turkey and south-east Europe) but 
also via Pakistan, while much of the cocaine from the Andean region comes 
through West Africa. But it ends up on the streets of our cities, and those 
cities too can contribute to resolving the problem. 
The United Nations and the UN Conventions 
10. The main international instrument for combating the trade in illicit drugs is 
the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, signed on 30 March 1961. It 
entered into force on 13 December 1964. Article 36 requires criminalisation 
of “cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, 
offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms 
whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation 
and exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention”. 
However “when abusers of drugs have committed such offences, the Parties 
may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in 
addition to conviction or punishment, that such abusers shall undergo 
measures of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social 
reintegration.” 
11. The 1961 Single Convention is supplemented by two further Conventions. 
The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed on 21 February 
1971, controls LSD, ecstasy, and other drugs whose special psychoactive 
effects exclude them from the scope of the Single Convention. The UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, signed on 20 December 1988, adds additional enforcement 
mechanisms for fighting drug traffickers, including asset forfeiture provisions, 
and establishes a system of drug precursor regulation. The EU is a signatory 
to this Convention, but not to the Single Convention or the 1971 
Convention, although all its Member States are signatories of all three. The 
three Conventions have been adopted by over 180 countries out of the 193 
UN Member States. Amendment of the Conventions would need agreement 
of all signatory States, and so for practical purposes is unlikely to be 
achievable.5 
12. Whether the Single Convention requires the criminalisation of personal use 
and possession for personal use is a vexed question. Mike Trace, the Chair of 
the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), who was formerly Chief 
of the Demand Reduction Section of the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), told us: “In international law terms, the conventions 
themselves are very complex documents and have an awful lot of flexibility 
and allow for all sorts of experimentation at national and regional level.”6 
The majority of the bodies that have pronounced on this have taken the view 
that “possession” in Article 36 is in the context intended to mean possession 
for trafficking. In particular, the report of the International Narcotics Control 
Board for 2007, when discussing the principle of proportionality, concluded 
                                                                                                                                  
5 Q 162 (Costa) 
6 Q 98 
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that “with offences involving the possession, purchase or cultivation of illicit 
drugs for the offender’s personal use, the measures can be applied as 
complete alternatives to conviction and punishment”.7 The Portuguese 
Government, when formulating the policy of decriminalisation we describe in 
Chapter 5, was advised that taking drug possession and use out of the penal 
system and making it subject to administrative penalties was compatible with 
the Conventions.8 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
13. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was established, 
under a different name, in 1997 by the joinder of two earlier agencies. The 
two main strands of its work are field-based technical cooperation projects to 
enhance the capacity of UN Member States to counteract illicit drugs, crime 
and terrorism, and research and analytical work to increase knowledge and 
understanding of drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence base for 
policy and operational decisions. Ninety per cent of its funding comes from 
the governments of UN Member States. The Home Office told us that the 
EU is particularly active at the UNODC and is recognised as one of the main 
donors to the organisation. In 2010, the EU donated US$ 15.6 million to the 
UNODC, which included funding for the UNODC programme to combat 
illicit drug trafficking in West Africa.9 
14. One of the notable recent initiatives of the UNODC is a discussion paper 
issued in 2010 entitled From Coercion to Cohesion.10 The then Executive 
Director, Antonio Maria Costa, in evidence to us described it as “a 
document that I consider probably one of the most important that I was ever 
associated with”.11 It states that “Moving from a sanction-oriented approach 
to a health-oriented one is consistent with the international drug control 
conventions”, and this is the approach the paper recommends. It is a subject 
to which we revert in Chapter 5. 
EU involvement 
15. Although there had been previous demonstrations of interest in the European 
Community about the drugs problem,12 it was the convening by the UN of 
an International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking that 
provided the catalyst. In August 1986 the Commission proposed that the 
European Community should take part in the preparatory work for the UN 
conference to be held in Vienna in June 1987.13 The Council decided on 26 
January 1987 that the Community should take part in the conference. It did 
                                                                                                                                  
7 EN/INCB/2007/1, paragraph 18 
8 Q 295(Goulão) 
9 Home Office paragraph 15 
10 From Coercion to Cohesion: treating drug dependence through health care, not punishment. Discussion paper 
based on a UNODC scientific workshop in Vienna, 28–30 October 2009. 
11 Q 170 
12 e.g. by the European Council in June 1985 and again in June 1986, and in a debate in the European 
Parliament on 9 October 1986 on a report by a “Committee of Inquiry into the Drugs Problem in the 
Member States of the Community”, chaired by Sir Jack Stewart-Clark MEP (OJ C283, 10 November 
1986, page 79). In 1991 the European Parliament set up a further “Committee of Inquiry on the spread of 
organised crime linked to drug trafficking”, chaired by Patrick Cooney MEP, which reported on 26 April 
1992 and was debated on 13 May 1992 (OJ C150 of 15 June 1992, page 41). Both Committees were 
divided in their views, and opinions in the Parliament were similarly divided. 
13 Recommendation of 5 August 1986, COM(86)457 final 
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so, represented by a Commissioner, and continued to participate in the 
negotiations which led to the signing of the 1988 UN Convention. 
16. In December 1989 a European Committee to Combat Drugs (CELAD)14 
was set up, with representatives of each of the Member States and the 
Commission. In June 1990 the Dublin European Council approved a study 
on the “need and possible scope of a European Drugs Monitoring Centre”, 
and in June 1991 the European Council, meeting in Luxembourg, decided in 
principle that such a Centre should be set up, and instructed CELAD to 
continue with detailed work. The result was the adoption on 8 February 
1993 of a Council Regulation setting up the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).15 Its mandate was to observe, 
collate and disseminate—but not to judge. We discuss the valuable work of 
this agency in Chapter 6. 
17. The other EU agency which plays a major part in the fight against drugs is 
the European Police Office, Europol. The Convention between the Member 
States setting up Europol was signed on 26 July 1995 but did not come into 
force until 1 October 1998. However as early as 2 June 1993 there had been 
Ministerial agreement on the setting up of a Europol Drugs Unit which 
initiated what has since become one of the prime functions of Europol, and 
which absorbs 30% of its resources. We consider the part played by Europol 
in Chapter 4. 
EU Drugs Strategies and Action Plans 
18. The policies for EU involvement in the fight against drugs have over the 
years been set out in a variety of Strategies and Action Plans. The first of 
these came in June 1990 when the Dublin European Council, which we 
mentioned in paragraph 16, approved the first Guidelines for a European 
Plan to Combat Drugs. This document was adopted by the Rome European 
Council in December that year. It was followed by the first Action Plan so 
called covering the years 1995–1999,16 which accompanied the first 
Strategy.17 
19. The current pattern of a Council Strategy, formulated by the Council on the 
initiative of the Member States, implemented by a detailed Action Plan 
adopted by the Council on the proposal of the Commission, began in 2000. 
In 1999 the Commission had presented to the Council a Communication on 
a European Union Action Plan to Combat Drugs (2000–2004).18 In 
December 1999 the Helsinki European Council endorsed the EU Strategy 
on Drugs for 2000–2004,19 and in June 2000 the European Council in Santa 
Maria da Feira adopted the EU Action Plan on Drugs 2000–200420 which 
translated the Strategy into over 100 actions to be taken by the Member 
States, the Commission, the EMCDDA and Europol. 
                                                                                                                                  
14 The acronym for Comité européen de la lute anti-drogue. It was formally outside the EU structure, but its 
functions were taken over by the Committee constituted under Article 36 TEU when this was set up after 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
15 Regulation (EEC) No 303/93 of 8 February 1993, OJ L 36 of 12 February 1993 
16 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a European Union 
action plan to combat drugs (1995–1999), COM(1994)234 final 
17 9012/99 CORDROGUE 33 
18 COM(1999)239 final of 26 May 1999 
19 12555/3/99, 1 December 1999 
20 9283/00, 7 June 2000 
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20. The Justice and Home Affairs Council decided on 8 June 2004 that while 
Action Plans should continue to cover four years, the new EU Drugs 
Strategy which they implemented should cover the eight years 2005–2012, 
on the basis of two EU Action Plans on Drugs, each lasting four years 
(2005–2008 and 2009–2012) and each undergoing evaluation (in 2008 
and 2012); and the Council further decided that this Strategy should be 
adopted at the European Council of December 2004. The Horizontal 
Drugs Group21 started work on the new Strategy in July 2004, seemingly 
oblivious of the fact that the Commission was still busy evaluating the 
2000–2004 Strategy and Action Plan. This evaluation was completed 
barely two months before the end of 2004,22 and hence well after the 
Strategy had been drafted. 
21. A report by Giusto Catania MEP to the LIBE Committee of the European 
Parliament dated 7 December 200423 pointed to the perils of preparing a new 
Strategy before seeing the evaluation of the previous one, and without the 
comments of the EMCDDA. It urged more emphasis on public health, with 
an emphasis on “measures totally different from those currently selected to 
achieve the overall EU Drugs Strategy objective, giving priority to protecting 
the lives and health of users of illicit substances, improving their wellbeing 
and protection by means of a balanced and integrated approach to the 
problem, since the relevant proposals are inadequate”. These views came too 
late to be heeded: the current Strategy for 2005–2012 had already been 
finalised,24 and was adopted by the European Council on 17 December 
2004. 
22. The first Action Plan to implement that Strategy in 2005–2008 was 
adopted in June 2005,25 and it was followed in December 2008 by the 
Action Plan for 2009–2012.26 The current Strategy and Action Plan are 
considered in the following chapter. The legislation adopted during those 
years—the 2004 Framework Decision on minimum penalties for 
trafficking, and the 2005 Decision on new psychoactive substances—are 
considered in Chapter 4. 
Subsidiarity and the limits of EU involvement 
23. The limit of the EU’s competence in relation to health problems caused by 
drugs is clear from Article 168 TFEU, which repeats the wording of Article 
152 TEC: “The Union shall complement the Member States’ action in 
reducing drugs-related health damage, including information and 
prevention.” Subject to this, subsidiarity applies, and the drugs policies of 
individual Member States remain within their exclusive competence. 
24. Should this continue to be the case? Although several witnesses have 
suggested increased activity at EU level, none have suggested that Member 
States should give up their primary responsibility for setting their drugs 
policies. For the Government Lord Henley, the Minister of State for Crime 
Prevention and Anti-Social Behaviour Reduction at the Home Office, told 
us: “We think it is right that different Member States should address these 
                                                                                                                                  
21 See paragraphs 148–149 
22 COM(2004)707 final, 22 October 2004 
23 A6–0067/2004 
24 Document 15074/04 of 22 November 2004 
25 OJ C168 of 8 July 2005, page 1 
26 OJ C326 of 20 December 2008, page 7 
 THE EU DRUGS STRATEGY 13 
things in their own way because different Member States have different 
problems according to their history or to the nature of where they are … but 
we also feel that there is a role for the EU … in making sure that there is 
practical co-operation between Member States …”27 
25. Professor Cindy Fazey of the University of Liverpool thought that there were 
two fundamental difficulties which vitiated against a comprehensive and 
universal European Union drugs policy and strategy: “… the principle of 
subsidiarity should be applied, giving individual countries the freedom to 
express their own experience, values, history and pragmatic ways that they 
see as best for them and their citizens when dealing with the illegal drug 
problem.”28 João Castel-Branco Goulão, the head of the Portuguese Institute 
on Drugs and Drug Addiction, told us: “I think the EU Strategy must give 
only the framework and general principles, and Member States must be able 
to define their own strategies.”29 
26. We agree with our witnesses that the health aspects, and most other 
aspects, of drugs policies should remain within the competence of the 
Member States. The role of the EU should continue to be to 
complement, and where possible to strengthen and add value to, the 
actions of Member States. 
27. Even if this were not our view, the practical difficulties of obtaining 
agreement to treaty change and the reluctance of many Member 
States to surrender their freedom of action on issues such as 
decriminalisation mean that this is the only realistic position for the 
foreseeable future. 
28. We welcome this instance of the practical application by the EU of the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
Differences at national level 
29. It is in their treatment of drug use and drug users that the national drug 
policies of Member States are at their most acutely different. This is partly 
due to the diverse shape of the illicit drug problem in different Member 
States, which may experience varying levels of drug use or which may be 
predominantly affected by use of different drugs.30 However, it is also to do 
with social and cultural factors within a country and with the history of the 
development of drug policy in each Member State. As Paul Griffiths, the 
Scientific Director of the EMCDDA told us: “We still have very divergent 
experiences of drug problems across Europe … It is also important to 
remember that cultural and substantive differences exist between countries, 
which means that policy articulation may be legitimately different at the 
national level.”31 For example, the drug user can be viewed by a national 
drug policy as, primarily, either a patient or as a criminal, which can lead to 
radically different strategies and implementations. These can best be 
understood by briefly outlining some of the more extreme policies in 
operation within the European Union. 
                                                                                                                                  
27 Q 314 
28 Fazey paragraphs 1 and 9 
29 Q 296 
30 An example given to us by Mandie Campbell, the Director of Drugs, Alcohol and Safety at the Home 
Office, was that the Czech Republic had to be able to tailor their strategies to problems with 
methamphetamine, whereas in the United Kingdom that drug was not a problem. (Q 26) 
31 Q 264 
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The Swedish experience 
30. Sweden has long been viewed as operating a relatively tough national drug 
policy. The approach is one of “zero tolerance” in an effort to achieve the 
national aim of “a drug free society”. No distinctions are made between 
“soft” and “hard” drugs, and users, as well as suppliers, are actively pursued. 
Since 1993 those who are suspected of using drugs can be subjected to blood 
or urine tests to determine whether use has taken place. If it has, criminal 
sanctions can be applied. Sweden is not the only European country to have 
criminalised use, but it is the only one to have empowered law enforcement 
officers to conduct tests to determine whether use has taken place. Emphasis 
is given to abstention based treatment, as opposed to those treatments that 
seek to reduce the harm experienced by drug users without necessarily 
requiring them to stop their drug use. In many respects, this national drugs 
policy is much stricter than in other Member States where (as in the United 
Kingdom) it is more usual for categorisations to be made between different 
drugs depending on the levels of harm associated with them, for suppliers to 
be pursued more actively than users, for the possession of drugs (rather than 
simply the use of drugs) to be illegal, and where harm reduction measures are 
more established. 
The Netherlands contrast 
31. The national drug policy in practice in the Netherlands is often 
conceptualised as being at the opposite end of the spectrum to drug policy as 
practised by Sweden. The idea of a “drug free society” is rejected by the 
Dutch as implausible and, instead, a pragmatic policy has been allowed to 
develop. At the heart of this policy is the belief that drug use should, as far as 
that is possible, be normalised and that drug users, rather than being 
ostracised or marginalised from mainstream society, should be encouraged to 
be in contact with service providers, whether or not they wish to cease their 
drug use. This pragmatism has also resulted in the Netherlands’ unique 
“separation of the markets” policy where cannabis is viewed as less harmful 
than other drugs and, in an effort to keep users of cannabis away from a 
market awash with other more harmful drugs, the sale and use of cannabis is 
tolerated in coffee shop environments and has therefore effectively been 
decriminalised. Dutch drug policy also displays a strong commitment to the 
harm reduction principle that aims to reduce the harm experienced by drug 
users whether or not they have been successful in abstaining from drugs: the 
Netherlands was the first country to champion the provision of needle 
exchange schemes for injecting drug users, and continues to be at the 
forefront of harm reduction initiatives by providing safe user rooms for drug 
addicts and the regulated supply of heroin to heroin addicts. 
32. The differences between drug policy in Sweden and the Netherlands 
evidence the deep divide in the way that Member States conceptualise the 
problem of drug use and drug users. This contrast is further compounded by 
the fact that both Sweden and the Netherlands report relatively low lifetime 
prevalence of drug use amongst their general populations.32 Many attempts 
have been made to judge between the relative merits of Dutch and Swedish 
policy;33 however, this diversity in national drug policy within Europe, which 
                                                                                                                                  
32 See EMCDDA Statistical Bulletin for 2011: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats11  
33 E.g. in the Stewart-Clark and Cooney reports: see footnote 12  
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was supported by all those of our witnesses who gave us their views on this 
issue,34 may well be an important asset. 
Portuguese decriminalisation 
33. In recent years, several other Member States have experimented with radical 
forms of drug policy that can provide valuable lessons and examples for the 
rest of Europe. The prime example is Portugal. In 2001 Portuguese drug 
policy was radically rewritten to reflect a growing desire to reduce the harm 
and damage experienced by drug users. The Portuguese drug law of 200135 
decriminalised the possession of drugs for personal use and drastically 
improved both treatment and harm reduction measures available to drug 
users. We discuss this in more detail in Chapter 5: it is sufficient to say here 
that evaluations of the change in Portuguese drug strategy have been broadly 
positive and that representatives from many countries have expressed interest 
in these ideas. 
Policy reversals in the Czech Republic 
34. Much less well known than these recent changes to Portuguese drug policy 
are those that have taken place in the Czech Republic and which reflect the 
rising desire for an evidence based drug policy. In 1998 a Bill was passed in 
the Czech Republic to criminalise the possession of drugs for personal use.36 
Following this, a two year cost-benefit analysis was conducted to determine 
the effectiveness of the new criminalisation policy. The main findings of this 
evaluation were that, during the first two years of enforcement, the 
availability and use of drugs increased, as did the number of new drug users. 
Furthermore, the social costs of illicit drug use also increased significantly.37 
In 2010, the Czech Republic, partly on the basis of this evidence, formally 
decriminalised possession of illegal drugs for personal use.38 
The position on the ground 
35. If the national drug policies of Member States are to be evidence based, then 
it is of the utmost importance that the views of those on the ground, those 
working with and living in the same communities as drug users, are heard. As 
we have seen above, different Member States have significantly different 
experiences of the illicit drug problem and have developed radically different 
responses to it. Even within a country, different areas may have very different 
experiences of the drug problem and may require different styles of policy 
intervention. Frank Zobel, the Head of Policy in the Evaluation and Content 
Co-ordination Unit at the EMCDDA, explained that in Switzerland, a 
federal State, there was subsidiarity at national level and again in the cantons 
which implemented the policies they wanted. The model had the great 
advantage of allowing for experimentation, in that different policies could be 
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35 Decree-law 183/2001, 21 June 2001 
36 Jelsma, M. ‘The Development of International Drug Control: Lessons Learned and Strategic Challenges 
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38 Cunningham, B. ‘New Drug Guidelines are Europe’s Most Liberal’, The Prague Post, 23 December, 2009 
16 THE EU DRUGS STRATEGY 
compared.39 France and Germany also leave much drug policy decision-
making to the regional authorities. 
36. We heard evidence from the Reverend Eric Blakebrough, the founder of the 
Kaleidoscope project that works with drug and alcohol users in Kingston-
upon-Thames and in South Wales, who referred to these differences as 
experienced within the United Kingdom. In his evidence to us, 
Mr Blakebrough stated that “the drugs scene has a certain cultural element, 
and that varies from district to district. Even within the United Kingdom 
there is room for different approaches and different innovations”.40 For 
example, he attributed the main cause of drug use in Kingston-upon-Thames 
to be rebellion by young people against the middle class aspirations of their 
families whereas in Llanelli, South Wales, it was more to do with 
unemployment, and the boredom and lack of opportunities experienced by 
young people in the area. Dealing with drug users of these differing types 
unsurprisingly required different resources and strategies.41 
37. This evidence provided by Mr Blakebrough is further illustrated at the 
European level by the foundation of sub-national city networks formed to 
work together to combat the illicit drug problem despite national policy 
differences: European Cities Against Drugs (ECAD),42 and European Cities 
on Drug Policy (ECDP)43 which favours a more libertarian approach. These 
networks reflect the recognition that situational factors have become 
increasingly important in determining drug policy responses. Generally 
speaking, large cities are hit the hardest by the illicit drug problem and tend 
to be a focal point of both drug users and drug suppliers.44 It therefore makes 
sense for some cities to adhere to similar principles in responding to and 
dealing with the specific city-level illicit drug problem, even where vastly 
different traditional national philosophies of drug policy are in operation. By 
way of example, ECAD was initiated by Stockholm in 1994 to bring together 
cities opposing the legalisation of drugs, but includes among its members 
towns in both Portugal45 and the Netherlands.46 
38. The current Drug Strategy calls for consultation with “representative NGOs, 
civil societies and local communities”, while the Drug Action Plan suggests 
the development of a drug policy that is “relevant to professionals and civil 
society while at the same time enabling these structures to provide feedback 
to inform policy”. Vice-President Reding told us that there was a Civil 
Society Forum on drugs, with 35 organisations coming together from across 
the EU. “We encourage them to do that and, through our drug prevention 
and information programme, we fund many activities and organisations that 
contribute at the local or national level to drug policy discussions.”47 
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and urban strategies, European Addiction Research, 1, 128–38; Kaplan, C. And Leuw, E. (1996) A tale of 
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Policy and Research, 4, 74–89 
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However Mike Trace, who is a member of the Civil Society Forum, was less 
than complimentary about it, telling us that those invited were “the people 
who tend to turn up in Brussels and make a big noise.” But he conceded that 
it was “maturing slowly”.48 
39. Mr Blakebrough welcomed this emphasis on community involvement, 
networking and the exchange of information in his evidence: “Europad49 
conferences have often enabled practitioners to learn from each other, and it 
has transformed some clinics when they have gone to one in another country, 
for example, and seen an atmosphere that prompts them to think, ‘is our 
agency as good as that?’”50 He took the view, however, that this is an area 
where more could be done at the European level, both to communicate the 
findings of drug policy evaluations to the voluntary sector and to assist with 
funding to allow ordinary delegates to participate in European level 
conferences and networking events.51 The importance of any drugs strategy 
being informed by public debate, and taking full account of the experience of 
practitioners, is more fully explored in Chapter 8. 
40. The EU Drugs Strategy and national drugs strategies should involve 
and encourage direct cooperation between cities, local authorities and 
organisations across national boundaries, and where possible 
promote such activities. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CURRENT EU STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN 
The 2005–2012 Strategy 
41. The 2005–2012 Strategy begins with a backward look at the 2000–2004 
Strategy and Action Plan. 
BOX 1 
Summary of progress in 2000–2004 
The results of the final evaluation of the EU Drugs Strategy and Action Plan 
2000–2004 indicate that progress has been made in achieving some of the 
targets of the current Strategy. In addition, many of the actions set out in the 
current Action Plan have been implemented or are in some stage of being 
implemented. However, the available data do not suggest that there has been 
a significant reduction in drug use prevalence or that the availability of drugs 
has been substantially reduced.52 
42. The lack of progress in either drug use or drug availability led the Council to 
believe that the new Strategy should concentrate on demand reduction and 
supply reduction. 
BOX 2 
Demand reduction and supply reduction 
In the field of demand reduction the EU Drugs Strategy 2005–2012 will aim 
for the following concrete, identifiable result: measurable reduction of the 
use of drugs, of dependence and of drug-related health and social risks 
through the development and improvement of an effective and integrated 
comprehensive knowledge-based demand reduction system including 
prevention, early intervention, treatment, harm reduction, rehabilitation and 
social reintegration measures within the EU Member States. Drug demand 
reduction measures must take into account the health-related and social 
problems caused by the use of illegal psychoactive substances and of poly-
drug use in association with legal psychoactive substances such as tobacco, 
alcohol and medicines. 
In the field of supply reduction, the EU Drugs Strategy 2005–2012 and the 
Action Plans are to yield the following concrete, identifiable result by 2012: a 
measurable improvement in the effectiveness, efficiency and knowledge base 
of law enforcement interventions and actions by the EU and its Member 
States targeting production, trafficking of drugs, the diversion of precursors, 
including the diversion of synthetic drug precursors imported into the EU, 
drug trafficking and the financing of terrorism, money laundering in relation 
to drug crime. This is to be achieved by focusing on drug-related organised 
crime, using existing instruments and frameworks, where appropriate opting 
for regional or thematic cooperation and looking for ways of intensifying 
preventive action in relation to drug-related crime.53 
43. The Home Office explained in its written evidence: “The strategy clarifies 
that the role of EU action is to support the efforts of Member States in 
reducing drug trafficking and misuse and the harms that they cause to 
individuals and society. It provides a base for the development of Action 
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Plans that clearly define operational responsibilities and deadlines for 
implementation that can be translated into clear indicators of progress.” 54 
The 2009–2012 Action Plan 
44. We have already noted that the Strategy provided that it should be 
implemented by two consecutive four-year Action Plans.55 The second of 
these, covering 2009–2012, lists 24 objectives to be achieved by 72 separate 
actions. In the timetable, most of them are listed as “ongoing”. Many are 
simply continuations of actions in the previous Action Plan. Some, like “The 
Commission and Council to ensure coherence between internal and external 
drug policy” and “To ensure that EU relations with third countries reflect 
the objectives of the EU Drugs Strategy and Action Plans” are not so much 
actions as simply policy guidance. We should not be taken to be saying that 
there is no merit in listing all these matters in one place, but in many cases 
we doubt whether an evaluation of them can be used or expected to show 
whether or not there has been progress in the fight against drugs. 
45. The Plan states that in 2012 there should be “an external, independent 
assessment carried out of the implementation of the EU Drugs Strategy 
2005–2012 and EU Drugs Action Plan 2009–2012, followed by a reflection 
period prior to follow-up”. This evaluation is to be carried out by the 
Commission, Council and Member States in 2012, and there is also to be an 
external evaluation published in 2012. We are not aware what progress has 
yet been made on these evaluations. 
What has the 2005–2012 Strategy achieved? 
Overall 
46. Lord Henley believed that the Strategy had added value because it had 
helped to facilitate practical cooperation to reduce demand and tackle 
supply, as well as to build up research; but it was clear that he regarded 
practical cooperation between the Member States as the main purpose of the 
Strategy.56 
47. In written evidence Europol saw “certain strong points of the Strategy” such 
as greater coherence and convergence of drug policies between countries on a 
voluntary basis, guidance for sharing of best practice, and the development of 
common standards in many key areas. But the evidence continues: “Most 
objectives and actions in the Action Plans are implemented indirectly: the 
Action Plans aim to influence the actions of others. This, combined with the 
lack of relevant comparable and reliable data on the drug phenomenon, drug 
demand and drug supply reduction means that it is very difficult to assess 
how much influence in general the Strategy has had in impacting upon the 
drug situation in the EU.”57 
Reduction in drug demand 
48. Since reductions in drug demand and supply were the two main aims of the 
Strategy, we particularly asked our witnesses to what extent they thought 
these had been achieved. Professor Susanne MacGregor from the London 
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School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine emphasised the importance of 
being aware that demand reduction related not only to attempts to control 
the use of drugs but also to addressing the harms caused by the use of drugs. 
“In that area of moves towards reducing the harms related to drug use, I 
think the strategy has been very successful. It has made many achievements 
in a relatively short period of time.”58 
49. The figures from the EMCDDA show that, over this period, there have been 
decreases in the demand for some drugs in some Member States. 
Ms Campbell, Director of Drugs, Alcohol and Community Safety at the 
Home Office, told us that “drug use is actually falling in a number of 
countries across Europe—certainly not everywhere”.59 She added that 
England was showing some of the biggest reductions of drug prevalence 
across the EU. While the figures we have seen bear this out, the fall is almost 
entirely due to reduction in the use of cannabis. She also told us that for the 
most serious drugs the most recent figures of the numbers of people in 
England who were presenting for treatment were falling. 
50. Not all our witnesses were as negative as Professor Fazey, who said: “HIV 
has been reduced substantially among intravenous drug users and also 
hep[atitis] B, hep[atitis] C and other diseases associated with intravenous 
drug use. The rest of it is pie in the sky. It is, ‘We are going to reduce 
demand.’ How? Where is the implementation? Where are the measures? 
There are none.”60 
51. What is beyond doubt is that, over the EU as a whole, and over the seven 
years of this Strategy, there has been no overall demand reduction. The 
current position is summarised in the latest Annual Report of the 
EMCDDA. 
BOX 3 
EMCDDA Annual Report for 2011 
In many respects, this year’s report is one of contrasts. On the one hand, 
drug use appears to be relatively stable in Europe. Prevalence levels overall 
remain high by historical standards, but they are not rising. And in some 
important areas, such as cannabis use by young people, there are positive 
signs. On the other hand, there are worrying indications of developments in 
the synthetic drugs market and, more generally, in the way drug consumers 
now use a wider set of substances.61 
Reduction in drug supply 
52. It is more difficult to assess whether there has been an overall reduction in 
drug supply in the EU over this period. The EMCDDA and other bodies do 
not evaluate initiatives to combat drug supply, so there is less evidence to go 
on. But we have not seen evidence to suggest that there has been any 
measurable overall reduction in supply. 
53. It is certainly the case that there have been significant successes in action 
against drug trafficking, and in the seizure of the proceeds of crime and the 
use of measures against money laundering. We look at this in Chapter 4. 
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Clearly, without this, there might have been increases in supply. But the 
persistence of drug traffickers, and in particular the displacement effect 
which we discuss in the following chapter, mean that overall there does not 
seem to have been a reduction in drug supply. 
The global influence of the EU 
54. The Strategy aims at a “coordinated, effective and more visible action by the 
Union in international organisations”. 
BOX 4 
The strategy for external relations 
The EU should aim to expand its political influence in the international 
arena and to achieve maximum impact with the resources it devotes to 
combating drugs production and trafficking and reducing the demand for 
drugs and related negative consequences.62 
55. Europol told us in written evidence that the Strategy was important for 
international cooperation: “The EU has gained influence in the international 
arena in the field of drugs, because it has been able to work on the basis of 
the consensus reflected in the Strategy and Action Plans.”63 This however 
was not the view of other witnesses. On the contrary, Mike Trace believed 
that the EU was “massively handicapped” by the fact that its Member States 
had different domestic policies.64 An example given by Professor Alex 
Stevens, Professor in Criminal Law and Justice at the University of Kent, was 
of negotiations in 1999 in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The EU had 
attempted to present a common front to negotiate the insertion of the term 
“harm reduction” in a Declaration, but the United States negotiators had no 
difficulty in defeating this by putting pressure on individual Member States.65 
56. It seems to us that the EU as such has little influence at international level, 
and that this will continue to be the case as long as there are such wide 
differences between the national policies of the Member States. 
Summary 
57. It is clear that there are differences of opinion between our witnesses as to 
the value of the current Drugs Strategy. Like the majority of our 
witnesses, we believe that the Strategy has been of some value despite 
the fact that neither of its two main policy objectives has been 
achieved. Very broad brush objectives such as these are not 
particularly meaningful. The next Strategy needs a more focused 
direction. We consider in Chapter 8 what this should be. 
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CHAPTER 4: DRUG TRAFFICKING AND DRUG CONTROLS 
The fight against drug trafficking 
58. The trafficking of drugs is a serious criminal offence throughout the EU, and 
usually involves other serious offences—firearms, sometimes murder, too often 
the use of ‘mules’ to carry drugs who occasionally die from the drugs they are 
carrying. Its international dimension is as prominent as that of any other 
serious organised crime. The EU has legislation and agencies whose purpose is 
to help the Member States deal with serious crime, and which play a major 
part in combating drug trafficking. We consider these matters in this chapter. 
59. Europol has a money laundering project, Sustrans, which was launched in 
2001 to establish a pan-European platform for the analysis of suspicious 
transactions reports (STRs). Sustrans considers the detection and disruption of 
criminal monetary flows, generated from drug trafficking and leaving the EU 
for high risk destinations and source countries, to be a priority area. Its surveys 
demonstrate that drugs offences are one of the most prevalent predicate 
offences66 underlying STRs, surpassed only by fraud and tax evasion.67 
60. Ms Campbell explained to us how the fight against organised crime was run. 
The EU set the priorities across eight areas in Europe which were the focus 
for organised crime. Four of the eight priority areas were focused on drugs. 
There was a policy area focusing on the western Balkans; one on West 
Africa, where the United Kingdom played the leading part; one on container 
traffic, led by the French; and one on new psychoactive substances with the 
Dutch in the lead.68 
61. The Home Office gave us some examples of what Ms Campbell called “some 
fantastic success in disrupting large amounts of cocaine coming towards the 
United Kingdom”.69 
BOX 5 
The Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre—Narcotics 
The EU-funded Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre—Narcotics 
(MAOC(N)), coordinates the law enforcement and military assets of the 
United Kingdom, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, France, Portugal, and Spain in 
joint counter-drugs work in the Atlantic and off the coast of West Africa. 
MAOC(N) has facilitated the seizure of more than 50 tonnes of cocaine and 
over 45 tonnes of cannabis since 2007. In June 2011, acting on intelligence 
provided by SOCA and the French Customs Investigative Service, UKBA 
officers at Southampton seized 1.2 tonnes of 90%-pure cocaine from a 
pleasure cruiser from Venezuela which was being transported by container 
ship from the British Virgin Islands to the UK en route to the Netherlands. A 
Dutch law enforcement investigation was then carried out, assisted by SOCA 
and UKBA, to identify the group attempting to traffic the cocaine. Six arrests 
were made on 2 August 2011. Links with DNRED, the British Virgin Islands 
Police and MAOC(N) were crucial in this operation.70 
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Ms Campbell told us that as a result of operations like this, the wholesale price 
of cocaine in this country was the highest it had ever been, and the purity 
levels at street level the lowest. Most of the seizures at street level had a purity 
level of 20% or less. She regarded this as a clear indicator of the success of law 
enforcement colleagues in getting cocaine off the streets of the country.71 
The displacement effect 
62. It is unfortunately too often the case that the interdiction of one drugs transit 
route simply leads to the opening of another. Rob Wainwright, the Director 
of Europol, told us: “There is significant evidence that displacement occurs. 
The operational success that I talked about earlier72 in Western Europe 
against major cocaine trafficking entering the traditional ports of entry in 
Europe—Spain, Portugal and Holland—clearly led to a displacement of 
those routes through West Africa increasingly and, as I said earlier, there are 
even signs that cocaine is entering the EU through Turkey and, we know 
also, through other parts of Eastern Europe.”73 
63. This displacement effect is more than just a disappointment for those 
combating drug trafficking. Tactical success is, in the view of Dr Axel Klein 
from the Centre for Health Service Studies at the University of Kent, 
“spelling a strategic disaster for countries hitherto uninvolved in drug 
trafficking.” Poor countries are unlikely to attract the interest of traffickers 
because of the modest promise of their domestic markets, but once they are 
woven into international trafficking networks, local consumption often takes 
off: “… in effect, anti trafficking measures contribute to the widening of drug 
markets and related problems.”74 A UNODC report states that, although 
there are no current reliable studies on the level of drug use in West African 
countries, there are many anecdotal sources claiming that “cocaine use has 
soared since the region began to be used as a trafficking zone.”75 
64. It is not, however, just by leading to increased drug use that the displacement 
of drug trafficking can cause significant problems. Youngers and Rosin 
(2005) in their exploration of the impact of anti-trafficking policies in Latin 
America conclude that “international drug trafficking breeds criminality and 
exacerbates political violence, greatly increasing problems of citizen security 
and tearing at the social fabric of communities and neighbourhoods. It has 
corrupted and further weakened local governments, judiciaries and police 
forces … it can be extremely damaging to local environments”.76 Dr Klein 
further explored these tensions between anti-trafficking and “the role of good 
governance” in his written evidence to us.77 
Human rights implications 
65. Dr Klein also told us that the law enforcement agencies of some third 
countries involved were poorly trained and disregarded the human rights of 
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alleged drug traffickers and of drug addicts who returned to their countries 
after serving sentences abroad. He cited Nigeria as a particular example.78 
The All Party Parliamentary Group for Drug Policy Reform (APPGDPR) 
said they were “persuaded by the detailed and informed points set out … in 
his written evidence”,79 though other witnesses did not believe these 
allegations were justified. The Home Office told us that they had consulted 
colleagues working in the area, including representatives of the EU and the 
UNODC, and found no credible evidence to support these allegations.80 
66. Mr Trace, without giving any specific examples, told us that there were many 
parts of the world where the view was taken that the drug problem was such 
a threat to society that “the human rights of drugs users or communities 
where drugs are grown and distributed are negotiable, and it is considered 
reasonable to say that for the achievement of drug law enforcement 
objectives we will work around human rights obligations.”81 
67. The APPGDPR cited to us a report from Amnesty International drawing 
attention to the executions in 2011 of 488 people including children for drug 
trafficking offences in Iran. “Most have been executed after trials with no 
access to a lawyer and no right of appeal. Iran has been assisted in what it 
calls its “war on drugs” by significant amounts of aid from the European 
Union, which is currently providing funding of €9.5 million over three years 
for a project based in Iran to strengthen regional anti-narcotics cooperation 
between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.”82 
68. We believe that, when measures against drug trafficking are being 
planned, more attention must be paid to the displacement effect, to 
other possible unintended consequences, and to the impact of the 
measures on those not previously involved. 
69. When the EU provides assistance to third countries in anti-trafficking 
measures, it must make clear that the resources are to be used in a 
way compatible with the human rights of those involved. It should 
take steps to monitor the programmes it supports and to ensure that 
they do not result in human rights violations, in particular the 
application of the death penalty. 
Europol 
70. As we have mentioned,83 even before Europol was formally set up there was a 
Europol Drugs Unit established by ministerial agreement of 2 June 1993, which 
became operational in January 1994. It dealt only with international illicit drug 
trafficking. Its mandate was extended to deal with other serious international 
crime in 1995.84 Once Europol was formally established, combating unlawful 
drug trafficking was one of its initial objectives.85 The Director stressed that 
“drugs—or the combating of international drugs trafficking—remains the area 
of operational work in which we are most engaged, of all the criminal sectors 
that we are working in. It accounts for about 30% of our operational work.”86 
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71. In our 2008 report on Europol87 we expressed astonishment and concern 
that up to 80% of information exchanged at Europol between the liaison 
officers of Member States was exchanged without involving Europol at all, 
and we made recommendations for improvement. But in November 2011 
the Director told us: “Even when the information is routed through our 
liaison bureau at Europol itself, the statistics show still that only 50% of that 
material is even cross-checked with our central databases, is even referred to 
our analysts. I fail to understand this, I really do, because it clearly denies an 
intelligence opportunity to the investigators. We have unique and very 
substantial databases on drug-related crime at Europol. Very often we are 
finding connections with criminal cases, and I am always surprised when the 
investigators do not have the ingenuity or the inclination to even check that 
database. That is something that I am focused on trying to change.”88 
72. This is only a meagre improvement. We share the Director’s dismay that the 
use of Europol databases is still so limited. We agree with him that there 
needs to be pressure on national agencies to share information with Europol. 
The Government should fully support the Director in seeking to 
improve the use of Europol’s unique databases and other facilities, 
and should urge other governments to do the same. 
Money laundering and seizure of the proceeds of crime 
73. Chasing the illicit profits from drug trafficking is a major part of Europol’s 
strategic response to the problem, and one for which it depends on the financial 
institutions in their reporting of suspicious financial transactions and in their 
successful implementation of anti-money-laundering legislation. Europol plays 
a key coordinating role for asset recovery officers across Europe.89 
74. The main international legal instrument to combat money laundering is the 
Council of Europe Warsaw Convention.90 It was opened for signature in May 
2005 and entered into force in May 2008. It is now in force in 22 States. The 
United Kingdom has not signed or ratified it. In October 2009, in their response 
to our Money Laundering report,91 the previous government said that they would 
be signing the Convention “in the very near future”. When the report was debated 
in the House of Lords on 7 December 2009 the Minister, Lord Brett, gave a 
commitment that implementation “will be finalised as soon as possible in 2010”.92 
75. In May 2011, in our report on The EU Internal Security Strategy,93 we again 
urged the Government (by now the Coalition Government) to sign and ratify 
the Convention without further delay. Their response, in July 2011, was: 
“The UK already has robust legislation and other measures in place to 
combat money laundering, terrorist financing and to seize and confiscate the 
proceeds of crime. Indeed the UK is essentially compliant with, and largely 
goes beyond the minimal requirements of, the Warsaw Convention”. 
76. When Lord Henley gave evidence to us in December 2011, we asked him 
why, if the United Kingdom was “essentially compliant” with the 
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Convention, it had still neither signed nor ratified it. He replied: “We are 
pretty confident that we do comply with the Convention. We are pretty sure 
that the Proceeds of Crime Act deals with that, and it is widely seen as a 
model by many countries. Put very simply, as I understand it, the real 
problem comes down to the fact that, to be absolutely certain that we are 
compliant, we will need to do a forensic article-by-article survey of the entire 
Convention, and that will be a fairly resource-intensive exercise.” He was 
unwilling to give any commitment as to when the United Kingdom would 
sign the Convention, but hoped to do so “within the next year or so”.94 He 
repeated this view in a debate on 19 January 2012.95 
77. The “entire Convention” runs to 56 articles, fewer than half of which create 
any rights or impose any obligations of substance. This prolonged failure of 
successive governments, for the most unpersuasive reasons, to sign and ratify 
a major international instrument in a field which they purport to regard as 
highly significant, sends out entirely the wrong message to other States, 
police forces and national and international agencies involved in the fight 
against serious crime. Yet again, we urge the Government to sign and 
ratify the Warsaw Convention without further delay. 
EU development policy as a weapon against drug supply 
78. The most radical, and potentially the most effective, way of disrupting drug 
trafficking is by interrupting the supply at its source. Mr Costa described to 
us some of the different ways in which this had been attempted in different 
countries, but stressed how difficult it was to correlate cause and effect. We 
summarise this evidence in Box 6.96 
BOX 6 
Interrupting drug supply at source 
American-funded spraying of the coca cultivation in Colombia has been very 
effective. Over the year 2003–04 Colombian cultivation decreased from 
164,000 hectares to 64,000, almost two-thirds. Now, was it spraying, which 
was massive? Was it because of success in counterinsurgency? Was it because 
of lower demand, especially in the United States? Was it because the 
Colombians were bumped off the market by the Mexicans, who became the 
biggest cartel in the world, and the Colombians basically cultivate it but do not 
sell it any more or bring it overseas as they used to? That is very hard to say. 
In Afghanistan the Karzai type of US-inspired eradication by the 
paramilitary, brought in to destroy the poppies, was a disaster. Targets were 
15,000 to 30,000 hectares to be eradicated yearly. Only 3,000 or 4,000 
hectares were eradicated with a very significant human cost because of 
security problems. 
Programmes based on development proved more successful. Laos was 
declared drug-free in terms of cultivation in 2006, mostly because the 
government sponsored institutions and programmes to assist the farmers. 
Morocco had a high of 134,000 acres of cannabis in the provinces of the 
north, engaged in a massive transformation of the economy of these 
provinces and succeeded in reducing it to marginal amounts. 
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79. Mr Costa’s view was that the development method is best, but it was slower 
and very costly: “it involves more than just buying whatever the farmers 
produce. It involves reorganising society and production at large.”97 
80. The EU is already devoting substantial resources to development policies in 
countries where diversification of their agricultural polices away from illegal 
drugs, like heroin and cocaine, is highly desirable and in the EU’s interest. 
Dr Klein told us that under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) 
funds were provided for a range of activities across demand and supply 
reduction, and these were to be continued under the 10th EDF. It was 
logical to have a regional programme combining drug control with anti crime 
and security measures, as drug trafficking was a transnational activity. 
However some developing regional institutions had yet to prove that they 
could handle such large sums of money.98 
81. We recommend that the EU and its Member States give added 
emphasis in their development policies to well focused projects for 
assisting countries to diversify their agricultural economies and stop 
growing illegal drugs. 
Minimum penalties for trafficking 
82. Despite sometimes significantly differing national policies, one area of drug 
policy making where Member States have traditionally been able to reach 
broad agreement of purpose lies in the control of illicit drug trafficking and 
traffickers. Drug policy making at the European level has thus been 
somewhat more advanced in this area. In 2004 a Framework Decision was 
adopted99 setting out minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of 
the offences of illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors so as to allow a 
common approach at European Union level to the fight against trafficking. In 
particular, it defines the acts that constitute criminal offences and sets the 
lowest level of maximum penalties that Member States must provide as 
sanctions for them. It specifically excludes from the list of criminal offences 
acts “committed by its perpetrators exclusively for their own personal 
consumption as defined by national law”. 
83. In 2009 a report was issued by the Commission on the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the Framework Decision.100 The report suggests that the 
instrument has failed on a number of measures. Importantly, the report 
concedes that the Framework Decision has not achieved its main aim of 
approximating the definition of criminal offences and levels of sanctions 
imposed: “There has thus been little progress in the alignment of national 
measures in the fight against drug trafficking.” Not all Member States 
implemented the provisions fully, and many others did not in fact amend 
their national legislation, as they already had provisions on drug trafficking as 
part of their drugs policies. Furthermore, the majority of Member States 
have lowest levels of maximum penalties that exceed those outlined in the 
Framework Decision, suggesting that it represents the bare minimum of 
sanctions in operation in Europe. For those Member States that have 
adopted the Framework Decision in their legislation, the possibility remains 
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for them to designate which drugs they will prioritise and which amounts 
they will consider as “large” or “serious”. 
84. It is clear from its October 2011 Communication Towards a stronger European 
response to drugs, which we consider in Chapter 8, that the Commission is still 
committed to development of policy in this area and to replacing this 
Framework Decision with a “more effective” Directive. The Director of 
Europol also believes that establishing minimum rules on the definition of 
criminal offences is an area where greater harmonisation might be 
beneficial.101 In our view, which accords with that of the Commission’s own 
report, the experience of the Framework Decision has shown that the pursuit 
of European policy in this area is unlikely to bring significant added value at 
national level. 
85. Given the significance of the problems with policy approximation even in this 
area of relative consensus, we remain unconvinced by the case for 
replacing this Framework Decision by a Directive, as suggested by 
the Commission in its October 2011 Communication, unless and until 
it can be shown that a Directive will be effective and will bring added 
value to this area of national drug policy making. 
New psychoactive substances (NPS or legal highs) 
86. Ms Campbell102 and Professor MacGregor103 agreed that the rapid 
development of new psychoactive substances (often termed ‘legal highs’) in 
recent years presents one of the most significant challenges currently facing 
drug policy development at both the European and the national level. In May 
2005 the Council adopted a Decision on the control of new psychoactive 
substances104 which establishes a mechanism for a rapid exchange of 
information on new psychoactive substances. It also provides for an 
assessment of the risks associated with new psychoactive substances. Where a 
significant risk is found to exist, it allows measures applicable in the Member 
States for the control of narcotic drugs to be applied to new psychoactive 
substances.105 Effectively, this Council Decision gives the European Union 
the power to ban newly discovered psychoactive substances where the risks to 
individuals and to societies are evaluated as being high. 
87. The first part of this Decision is concerned with the creation of an “early 
warning system” which collects information on newly developed psychoactive 
substances from across Member States and beyond. Ms Campbell described 
to us in her oral evidence the importance of this process in adding value to 
policy developed at the national level: “Colleagues around Europe notify 
each other of new substances as they are detected ... that type of information 
is particularly valuable to us, for anticipation and as an early warning”.106 
88. The powers to perform risk assessments based on information provided by 
the early warning system and, ultimately, to ban newly developed 
psychoactive substances, have not however been judged to be so successful. 
The Director of Europol told us that since 2005 115 new psychoactive 
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substances were reported through the early warning system, 41 in 2010 
alone.107 Yet over the six years that these powers have been in place, the risk 
assessment process has resulted in only two of these substances being banned 
throughout the Member States.108 Vice-President Reding informed us that it 
took one and a half years for the EU to conduct the risk assessment on 
mephedrone and then ban it; by this time the United Kingdom and 14 other 
Member States had already banned it without waiting for the EU 
Decision.109 
89. In 2011 the Commission produced its own report evaluating the functioning 
of the 2005 Council Decision.110 This highlights several major defects. The 
Decision is not able to handle the large increase in the number of newly 
developed psychoactive substances because it addresses them one by one. It 
is reactive rather than proactive, as it waits for each newly developed 
substance to be reported before it can take any action. These problems mean 
that it is too slow to take account of the rapid changes that occur in this area 
of drug policy. The Commissioner herself was highly critical of these 
powers.111 The Commission Communication Towards a Stronger European 
Drug Policy proposes stronger EU legislation on new psychoactive substances 
that can provide swifter and more sustainable answers to the emergence of 
these substances, possibly by exploring ways to address groups of substances 
together, rather than on a case by case basis. 
90. We question whether an automatic ban of each new substance as soon as it 
comes on the market is the right approach. In her evidence to us, 
Professor Cindy Fazey described the process whereby the producers of newly 
developed psychoactive substances are able to formulate new substances with 
highly similar molecular structures as soon as one substance is banned.112 
This makes it difficult to imagine how the EU can move from a strategy that 
is reactive to one that is proactive, and how it can hope to be more than one 
step behind the drug producers. Professor MacGregor also suggested that 
“cracking down too quickly on a new synthetic drug may move users to use 
more harmful drugs rather than to use the less harmful new synthetic drug”, 
and that banning “does not reduce the use; it simply has moved users to the 
black market rather than through [legal suppliers] on the internet”.113 
91. The current Council Decision and the proposed new legislation in this 
area114 focus on trying to make existing processes faster and therefore more 
effective, resulting in a higher number of substances that are banned 
throughout the Member States. However the evaluation of the Council 
Decision admits that “a large number of Member States wanted to consider 
alternative methods of control” and would like a wider range of options to be 
considered. 
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92. The United Kingdom has already adopted a different line: “Rather than, as 
many countries do, legislate for a particular substance, when we looked at a 
product called “Spice” a little while ago, a synthetic cannabinoid—like 
cannabis but created synthetically—we legislated for any number of related 
compounds to the ones we saw in the UK, so that if the chemists tried to 
make a slight alteration to the drug it would still be within our definition and 
therefore illegal.”115 The Polish Presidency seems to have agreed; in a note to 
the Horizontal Drugs Group116 it suggested that any revision of the 2005 
Decision should allow legislation to deal with groups of substances rather 
than individual substances. Poland has itself adopted such legislation,117 and 
the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) has suggested in its 
recent report on Novel Psychoactive Substances that such analogue legislation 
should be seriously considered.118 
93. In supplementary written evidence the APPGDPR suggested that a regulated 
market, such as already exists for alcohol and tobacco, could be set up for 
these newly discovered psychoactive substances that could be overseen in the 
United Kingdom by, for example, Trading Standards legislation or the 
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency. The ACMD further 
suggests that “demand reduction strategies should be developed including 
education, prevention and treatment interventions”, like those used for 
alcohol and tobacco, which could also be used for novel psychoactive 
substances.119 
94. We endorse the importance of the EU’s “early warning system” 
which exists to facilitate the exchange of information on newly 
developed psychoactive substances within the Member States and 
beyond. 
95. However the risk assessment and banning procedure of the 2005 
Council Decision is so cumbersome that we doubt whether it can be 
cured by amendment. We believe that decisions about banning such 
substances are, in most cases, best left to individual Member States. 
96. There is a strong case for the use in the United Kingdom, and indeed 
throughout the EU, of analogue legislation which allows drugs with 
similar molecular structures and similar effects to be banned as a 
group. 
97. Furthermore, we support the exploration of alternatives to banning 
new psychoactive substances, such as placing them within regulated 
markets similar to those that already exist for alcohol and tobacco, 
which attempt to control use through education and treatment rather 
than criminalisation. 
                                                                                                                                  
115 Q 33 (Campbell) 
116 16120/11, 4 November 2011 
117 See ACMD report on Novel Psychoactive Substances, October 2011, paragraph 11.20. 
118 ibid. chapter 11 and paragraph 12.18 
119 ibid. paragraph 12.45 
 THE EU DRUGS STRATEGY 31 
CHAPTER 5: HARM REDUCTION AND DECRIMINALISATION, 
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH 
98. In the Call for Written Evidence which we issued in July 2011120 we 
explained that the Committee’s terms of reference are “to consider European 
Union documents … and other matters relating to the European Union”, 
and that our inquiry would be considering the domestic drugs policies of 
States only as part of the context within which the EU operates. 
99. Nevertheless the collective strategy of the Member States within the 
European Union cannot be considered independently of the national 
strategies of those States. It was inevitable that we should receive written 
evidence explaining in some detail the very divergent policies of different 
Member States which form the background to the EU Strategy. We also took 
oral evidence to enable us to understand more clearly the reasons for this 
divergence, and the possible consequences. 
100. From our summary of the policies of Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
the Czech Republic121 it will be clear that it is in the area of drug use and 
drug users that there is the greatest variation of practice in different Member 
States. Two increasing trends have been seen across Europe in recent years: 
harm reduction and decriminalisation. In this chapter we examine the 
evidence we received, and draw some conclusions on how they sit within 
European drug policy making as a whole. 
Harm reduction 
101. Over the past 30 years, harm reduction has developed as a key concept 
within national and international drug policy debates. The International 
Harm Reduction Association defines harm reduction as: “policies, 
programmes and practices that aim primarily to reduce the adverse health, 
social and economic consequences of the use of legal and illegal psychoactive 
drugs without necessarily reducing drug consumption”.122 In their recent 
monograph on the subject, the EMCDDA recognise harm reduction as an 
important strand of drug policy encompassing “interventions, programmes 
and policies that seek to reduce the health, social and economic harms of 
drug use to individuals, communities and societies”.123 More generally, it has 
been associated with the designation of drug addicts as patients that need 
help rather than criminals that need punishment. 
102. Harm reduction as a drug policy strategy received attention across much of 
the Western world in the 1980s in direct response to concerns about 
HIV/AIDS. It had been noticed that levels of HIV/AIDS were particularly 
high amongst intravenous drug users, in part due to the practice of sharing 
the needles used to inject their drugs. Until this time, it had been standard 
practice for governments to make it as difficult as possible to obtain syringes 
as part of an overall drug prevention strategy. Needle exchange schemes, first 
introduced in the Netherlands but quickly spreading elsewhere, allowed 
intravenous drug users to bring back their used needles and exchange them 
for clean ones. 
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103. At the same time, substitution treatment was developed for heroin addicts. 
Those defined as not responding to other forms of treatment were offered the 
prescription of methadone, an opiate that can be taken orally. 
Controversially, this was not always as part of an overall programme that 
aimed to reduce drug use but could also be offered on a long-term basis, if 
the addict showed no willingness to begin to reduce use. 
104. In the 1980s and early 1990s, measures that would actually make it easier for 
drug addicts to continue using drugs attracted much criticism. Today, 
however, the evidence suggests124 that these kinds of initiatives have been 
vital in improving the health and life prospects of drug users. Needle 
exchange schemes and methadone maintenance programmes are no longer 
particularly controversial—every Member State has such programmes, and 
applicant States cannot join the EU until they have implemented them. 
Some Member States have begun to experiment with novel harm reduction 
measures like the provision of safe user rooms where drug addicts can use 
their drugs without fear of disturbing the public or being disturbed by the 
police, and the free prescription of heroin (rather than methadone) under 
supervised conditions. 
105. We referred in Chapter 2125 to the Catania report, which in 2004 suggested 
that the EU was not doing enough to promote harm reduction measures, but 
came too late to influence the 2005–2012 Strategy. To some extent this 
situation was rectified by the publication of the 2009–2012 Action Plan 
within which the underlying principles of harm reduction had gained a much 
stronger foothold, together with a 2010 EMCDDA research monograph 
focusing on the evaluation and promotion of harm reduction measures. 
Professor MacGregor suggested that: “the focus on harm reduction is well 
placed and has grown and is at the right level”126 but also drew attention to 
certain areas where more work is needed: for example in relation to the 
prevention of hepatitis and the reduction of drug-related harm for vulnerable 
groups (e.g. sex workers, migrant populations and people in prison).127 
Baroness Meacher drew attention to the disparity between the provision of 
interventions such as needle exchange programmes between East and West 
Europe, pointing out that “the 12 countries that joined the EU since 2004 
only account for 2% of substitution treatment in Europe as a whole … there 
is a tremendous need for the EU to take up this call to spread harm 
reduction and substitution treatment across to those mainly eastern 
European countries”.128 These statements are also supported by the 2010 
EMCDDA annual report.129 
Decriminalisation 
106. Harm reduction measures such as those described above are part of a policy 
that puts the protection of public health above the enforcement of the law, at 
least in terms of drug use and drug users, and emphasises the important role 
that treatment can play in reducing both the use of drugs and the problems 
that drug users face. One method of harm reduction that has received much 
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attention recently within Europe is the decriminalisation of the use of drugs 
or the possession of drugs for personal use. This policy aims to reduce the 
harm done to the users of drugs by preventing them from becoming 
criminalised through their use. 
107. Decriminalisation needs to be distinguished from legalisation, which is 
prohibited under the UN Conventions. Drugs are not legalised; instead, 
criminal penalties associated with the possession of small quantities of drugs 
for personal use, and the use of those drugs, are replaced by civil penalties 
such as requirements to attend treatment programmes. Further complicating 
the picture is the existence of a policy strategy of depenalisation whereby 
drugs remain illegal and criminalised, but the possibility of being sent to 
prison (again, for use or possession for personal use only) is removed.130 
Removing criminal penalties from the supply and trafficking of drugs is out 
of the question, and this needs to be clearly understood by those 
commenting on policies of decriminalisation. 
108. There is no uniform way of effecting a policy of decriminalisation, as 
demonstrated by the variety of practice currently observable within Member 
States. Portugal, representing the most advanced form of decriminalisation 
currently in operation in Europe, has removed the possibility of criminal 
sanctions for the possession of all drugs for personal use, replacing them 
instead with a range of civil penalties. Spain, the Czech Republic and Latvia 
have made civil sanctions the norm for possession of all drugs for personal 
use. Germany, Estonia and Lithuania have written the possibility of waiving 
prosecution of the possession of small amounts of any drug for personal use 
into their penal codes.131 
109. Other Member States have experimented with the decriminalisation of 
certain drugs only, usually cannabis. This is the long-standing situation in 
the Netherlands with its policy that tolerates the purchase and sale of small 
amounts of cannabis via the ‘expediency principle’ which stipulates that it is 
not in the public interest to prosecute for these offences. More recently, 
Belgium and Luxembourg effectively removed criminal sanctions for the 
possession of cannabis for personal use.132 It can be argued that the United 
Kingdom operated a system of decriminalisation of cannabis between 2004 
and 2009 when cannabis was downgraded to a Class C drug, although the 
power of arrest was retained in certain circumstances. 
110. By no means all countries are attracted to decriminalisation. Sweden pursues 
users as much as dealers. The United Kingdom recently upgraded cannabis 
to a class B drug. Denmark has tightened cannabis legislation.133 Despite the 
increase of countries relaxing laws around personal drug use and in particular 
with reference to cannabis, the latest EMCDDA annual report describes a 
situation where “the number of offences related to cannabis use in Europe 
continues to rise, against a background of stable or even declining 
prevalence. This highlights a possible disconnect between policy objectives 
and practice”.134 
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111. One example of the constructive use of the criminal law in this country was 
seen by some members of the Sub-Committee on a visit to West London 
Magistrates’ Court in Hammersmith to observe one of the five (initially six) 
dedicated Drug Courts in England in action.135 The judge was joined by a 
psychologist and a probation officer in assessing the best way forward for a 
drug user who had committed a criminal offence to fund his drug addiction. 
With the defendant on probation, and custody available as a sanction of last 
resort, the court was in a position to order the steps most likely to prevent 
him from reoffending and to keep him “clean”. The expense was obvious; 
but we were reminded of Ms Campbell’s evidence to us that “in this country 
for every £1 we invest in drug treatment, at least £2.50 is saved in reductions 
in crime and other costs.”136 
The Portuguese experience 
112. As we explained in Chapter 2, Portugal is the Member State which has gone 
furthest in incorporating both harm reduction and decriminalisation within 
its national drug policy. For this reason, we took evidence specifically on the 
Portuguese experience.137 
113. José Sócrates, the former Prime Minister of Portugal who, when Deputy 
Prime Minister, was the architect of the new policy, and João Castel-Branco 
Goulão, the director of the Portuguese National Drugs Agency, both 
described to us the history of drug use within Portugal as taking a dramatic 
change after the democratic revolution in 1974.138. Illegal drugs suddenly hit 
Portugal for the first time and there were no strategies in place to deal with 
such a problem. João Goulão described Portugal as having “one of the 
narrowest gaps between total prevalence of drug use and problematic drug 
use [with] 1 per cent of our population with problematic drug use”.139 In 
order to address these problems, Mr Sócrates told us, the decision was made 
to “put a pragmatic approach to drug issues into our law and put aside the 
ideological approach to get rid of all drugs and have a society free of 
drugs”.140 
114. Portuguese national drug law was changed in 2001 and a policy was 
implemented that was based around the principles of harm reduction, 
treatment and the decriminalisation of drug users. Under this new law, the 
treatment system was vastly expanded and anybody caught in possession of 
drugs for personal use (viewed as around ten days supply) was to be 
prevented from undergoing criminal prosecution, instead facing a ‘dissuasion 
committee’. Mr Goulão told us that the new law made the assumption that 
“a drug addict is mainly someone who needs health and social support rather 
than criminal conviction”.141 
115. This change in Portuguese law was undertaken more than ten years ago and 
some of the consequences can now be examined. Both Mr Goulão and 
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Mr Sócrates told us that, although a proper costing of the change in policy 
had not taken place, the new policy was much cheaper as the expansions 
made to the treatment system were far outweighed by the savings to the 
criminal justice system.142 Portugal has always had a relatively small number 
of drug users, in European terms,143 and, as such, a reduction in the overall 
number of drug users was never an important aim of the policy. In other 
areas, however, Portuguese successes have been dramatic. Mr Sócrates 
described how the courts had benefited by having so much time freed up,144 
as had the prisons, and Mr Goulão suggested the drug users had benefited 
because they were not ostracised and criminalised anymore.145 They also 
both cited the increased numbers in treatment and the significant reduction 
in numbers of drug users with HIV/AIDS.146 
116. Since these positive evaluations of the change in Portuguese national drug 
policy, many governments from around the world have sent representatives 
to study Portuguese policy before making changes to their own national 
strategies. Norway, the Czech Republic and Argentina, for example, have 
recently expressed interest in finding out more about Portuguese drug 
policy.147 
117. We were impressed by the evidence from Portugal on the 
effectiveness of their public health orientated national drug strategy. 
Harm reduction and public health policies are increasingly being 
adopted internationally, nationally and locally. We believe Member 
States should study each other’s policies and be more willing to learn 
from one another, and we recommend that the EU should promote 
and prioritise the evaluation of the effectiveness of these strategies. 
118. We take no position on whether in this country a change towards a 
policy of decriminalisation would be beneficial, since this is outside 
our remit, but we believe the debate would benefit from a clearer 
understanding of precisely what policy changes would be involved, 
and a closer study of the experience of other countries, particularly 
other Member States. 
119. We consider in Chapter 8 whether and to what extent the new EU Strategy 
should cover harm reduction. 
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CHAPTER 6:  THE EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE 
120. As we have explained in Chapter 2,148 the establishing of the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) in 1993 was 
the first concrete initiative to have been taken by the European Community 
in this field. It is still by a long way the most successful. 
121. The reason such a body was needed is clear from one of the Regulation’s 
recitals: “… objective, reliable and comparable information concerning 
drugs, drug addiction and their consequences is required at Community level 
to help provide the Community and the Member States with an overall view 
and thus give them added value when, in their respective areas of 
competence, they take measures or decide on action to combat drugs.”149 
122. The 1993 Regulation was amended a number of times before being replaced 
in 2006 by the Regulation which now governs its work.150 But the agency’s 
primary task is unchanged: the collection, analysis and dissemination of data 
relating to all aspects of the drug problem. Among its secondary tasks, it is 
also the implementing agency for the early warning system for psychoactive 
drugs which we describe in Chapter 4. 
123. The EMCDDA is also clear about what it does not do: “We are policy 
neutral; our task is to document and report, and never to advocate or 
lobby.”151 Paul Griffiths, the Scientific Director and our chief witness during 
our visit to the EMCDDA, put it this way: “We do not evaluate national 
policies but we can provide the tools to help Member States in their 
evaluation of their own policies. Our mandate does not ask us at present to 
judge the policies of Member States.”152 
Evaluation of its work 
124. The EMCDDA got off to a somewhat shaky start. In its early years it was, in 
the view of the Home Office, “by no means as effective as it is today.” An 
external evaluation of the first five years of the agency noted in 2000 that the 
EMCDDA needed to define a more focused work programme based on a 
limited number of priorities. Things have now changed. Our witnesses were 
unanimous about the value of its work and, in the view of the Home Office, 
“it is a tribute to the current Director Wolfgang Götz, Marcel Reimen who 
was until recently the Chair of its Management Board, and the scientific staff 
of the agency, that the EMCDDA is so highly respected today.” 153 
125. Academic witnesses were equally complimentary. Professor Fazey thought 
that “the EMCDDA is one of the most successful European institutions in 
the drugs field, if not the most successful, and I would argue very strongly for 
its expansion.” Professor Stevens added: “I think the three of us154 are agreed 
on the value of the EMCDDA and its strength and contribution to this 
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field.”155 It is clear that other organisations also think highly of the agency. 
Mr Costa said: “… the work of the Lisbon-based institutions and the 
availability of regionally coherent data has been a very important 
contribution to the work of UNODC.”156 The EMCDDA is held up by the 
World Health Organisation as “a shining example of a regional monitoring 
centre which benefits individual Member States, the EU as a whole and the 
wider international community.”157 In 2007 an evaluation for the 
Commission by an outside agency158 concluded that the annual report, its 
“flagship publication”, was especially well received by target groups. 
Reliance on national data 
126. The EMCDDA relies for its work largely on data supplied by the Member 
States through the REITOX network. 
BOX 7 
REITOX 
REITOX is the European information network on drugs and drug addiction. 
The network is comprised of national focal points in the EU Member States, 
Norway, the candidate countries and at the European Commission. Under 
the responsibility of their governments, these bodies are the main 
information interface between the EMCDDA and those States. They provide 
national drug information to the agency for EU-level analysis and act as the 
ambassadors for the EMCDDA in their home countries. 
127. The quality of the national data is very variable. Few countries in Europe 
collect annual data on the prevalence of drug use among the general 
population (apart from England and Wales and Sweden which collect annual 
data on cannabis use as part of a public health survey). The most frequent 
data collection via surveys of drug prevalence is every other year (in countries 
such as Scotland, Spain and Italy) whilst in some countries, for example 
Germany, data collection on drug use is not part of a regular data collection 
routine.159 But the main challenges are still the difficulty of attaining 
consensus and joint action on key indicators, and the variable quality of the 
national data. There are different collection methods, different policy 
contexts that make people more or less likely to come forward, differing 
definitions of what is a drug-related death or a drug-related crime. The 
EMCDDA is working towards standard definitions but progress is slow, and 
it has no powers of coercion. 
128. One reason for this tardiness is that Member States like to adhere to their 
current methods of collection to keep them comparable historically over 
time; it may be more important to them that their future statistics should be 
comparable with their past statistics than that they should be comparable 
with the future statistics of other Member States. Lord Henley explained: 
“… one does not want to get to a position where we cannot compare our 
own statistics with our previous statistics if we have changed the method of 
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doing them. However statistics are collected, we always want to make sure 
that we can see what the trends are.”160 
129. Despite this, the position is no longer as bad as it has been. Mr Griffiths told 
us that the EMCDDA had done a full assessment of the key indicator 
decisions. “The conclusion was quite a cheerful one: it is surprising how 
much of the data were comparable.”161 Nevertheless it is clear that the lack of 
reliable and comparable statistics hampers the understanding and effective 
formulation of drugs policy. 
130. We therefore recommend that a major effort should be made in the 
context of discussion of the next EU strategy to improve the quality 
and comparability of national statistics. This may require some 
change in the way that the United Kingdom and other Member States 
collect data, but we believe that the establishment of more consistent 
statistics would make the work of the EMCDDA even more valuable 
than it now is, and would amply repay the investment involved. 
131. Even between England and Scotland there are differences in the ways in 
which drug-related deaths are recorded. In Scotland a death has to be 
recorded within eight days of its taking place, but in England (where there 
are ten times as many drug-related deaths) only when there is a coroner’s 
verdict, which can be many months later. Cocaine-related deaths, which 
inevitably are referred to coroners, typically are not registered until nine 
months or more after the occurrence of the death. United Kingdom statistics 
on drug-related deaths sent to the EMCDDA for a particular year may 
therefore include a number of deaths the previous year.162 
132. The Government should seek to ensure that the reporting of drug-
related deaths is consistent across the United Kingdom, so that 
reports refer to the year of death and not to the year of registration of 
death. 
Evaluation of initiatives to deal with drug supply 
133. One issue affecting all the strategies considered here is a failure fully to 
evaluate initiatives to disrupt drug supply, and to understand the knock-on 
effects they may have in other areas. Professor Stevens explained that it had 
always been assumed that by taking certain actions to reduce supply, one 
could have significant impacts on the use of drugs, so there had been no 
investment in evidence to test that assumption. This lack of investment both 
at European and at national levels arose because of the uncontroversial 
nature of the assumption that by controlling the supply of drugs one would 
have an effect on the drug market.163 
134. Mr Griffiths told us that the EMCDDA recognised the problem; he set out 
at some length what they were trying to achieve, and the difficulties they 
faced. They were waiting for a proposal from the Commission on key 
indicators. “We have yet to see how that proposal is framed, and it is up to 
the Member States to decide what they want to do with that. We cannot 
make Member States provide us with data if they do not want to, so the will 
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and support of Member States will be crucial to improve the quality of 
data.”164 
135. There need to be thorough evaluations of measures to disrupt supply 
with a view to making them more effective and better focused, to 
determining their added value, and fully to understand their 
unintended consequences. The Government should support the 
efforts of the EMCDDA to take forward their plans on supply side 
indicators, and should persuade the Commission and other Member 
States to do likewise. 
EU research policy 
136. All Member States conduct drug-related research. A proportion of these 
studies are captured by reports through REITOX system, but there is 
currently no inventory of such research. Some of this research is funded by 
the EU through the seventh research framework programme (FP7) which 
runs to 2013. The EMCDDA, though not itself a major funder of new 
research, has an important role to play in disseminating information on the 
findings of research. Its Scientific Committee has made recommendations on 
the priorities for future research which include the effectiveness of 
treatments, policy analysis of Member States’ policies, the market for illicit 
drug supply, research to help understand the long-term course of different 
patterns of substance abuse, and research for estimating the size of the drug-
using population.165 
137. In their supplementary written evidence the Home Office attested to the 
value of drug related research under FP7 and argued that this should be a 
continuing priority for the EU. They told us about ERA-NET, the European 
Research Area Network, which sits under FP7. Its objective is to develop and 
strengthen the coordination of national and regional research programmes. 
The Commission provides funding for the process of coordination, while 
Member States which choose to participate fund the actual research. ERA-
NET 2012 includes a call for a “Drug demand and supply reduction ERA-
NET” which will support the Drug Strategy’s statement that information, 
research and evaluation are key elements in understanding the drug problem 
better than at present.166 
138. We hope that if viable research projects can be brought forward, ways 
will be found of financing them through the EU research 
programmes. This will help to ensure that future policies are 
evidence-based, since one of the weaknesses until now has been the 
lack of sufficient evidence. 
Resources 
139. The Director, Mr Wolfgang Götz, told us that over the past few years the 
EMCDDA had substantially increased its output with stable resources. His 
staff had no spare capacity. He outlined some of the work he would like to 
embark on if “the miracle” of additional resources happened, but accepted 
that this was not the time to ask for more resources. We agree that in the 
current economic climate this is probably the only realistic approach. But we 
also believe that the existing budgetary allocation of the EMCDDA should 
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be retained in real terms, and that Member States should not attempt to 
reduce it. The work of the EMCDDA is too valuable to be curtailed. 
Recommendations 
140. We welcome and endorse the universally high esteem in which the 
agency is held. We believe it should continue to work towards 
common definitions and a common data collection practice, and 
should encourage Member States to do likewise. We urge the 
Government to do all it can to assist in this. 
141. We agree that the EMCDDA should play no part in grading the 
success or failure of the policies of the different Member States. 
However we believe that the agency, without compromising its policy 
neutrality, could do more to indicate when the evidence points to a 
particular policy having been successful. 
142. During the current negotiations on the Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2014–2020, and during the annual budgetary negotiations, 
the Government should ensure that the resources of the EMCDDA 
are at least retained at their current level in real terms. 
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CHAPTER 7: EU INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
Responsibility for drugs policy in the Commission 
143. Until the end of 2009 the Commission dealt with all justice and home affairs 
(JHA) matters in a single Directorate-General, DG JLS,167 which was 
responsible for all aspects of the Commission’s involvement in EU drugs 
policy, including its involvement in Europol and the EMCDDA. When the 
current Commission took over in 2010, DG JLS was split into two separate 
Directorates, Home Affairs (Home), and Justice, Fundamental Rights, and 
Citizenship (Justice). Vice-President Viviane Reding, who is the Justice 
Commissioner, explained to us how this had affected drugs policy: “You 
know we have a separation between justice and home affairs, built on the 
new treaty. The responsibility for the horizontal co-ordination of the whole 
drugs policy is with Justice, as is the development of future policies. Home 
Affairs has the agency, but nothing else. Criminal law is done by Justice, for 
instance. There are other DGs that have some responsibility, such as DG 
Enterprise and TAXUD for direct precursor legislation.”168 
144. We do not understand why, in the division of the responsibilities of the 
former DG JLS, responsibility for the EU Drugs Strategy and Action Plans 
should have been allocated to DG Justice, although the main specific action 
is, in our view rightly, the responsibility of DG Home. In any forum, action 
on drugs encompasses a wide range of interests. In the United Kingdom the 
Home Office is the lead department, and Lord Henley, a Home Office 
Minister, chairs the inter-departmental ministerial group on drugs, “a group 
of Ministers from a wide range of departments, starting with health and 
going on to education, work and pensions, and others.”169 Plainly there must 
be full consultation between all those whose responsibilities are involved. But 
the lead should be taken by those with the primary responsibility. 
145. It can be argued, and was argued by the All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Drug Policy Reform, that “to reflect the importance of a health focus in EU 
drug policy it should be made clear in a future Strategy that the lead role for 
Drug Policy should be transferred from the Justice to the Health and 
Consumers Directorate.”170 While we do believe that more emphasis should 
be given to the health aspects of the drug problem, we do not agree with the 
wholesale transfer of responsibility suggested here. Nor do we feel, however, 
that DG Justice is either the most logical or the most appropriate Directorate 
to deal with narcotic drugs. In our view this is DG Home. It will be seen in 
the following chapter that the Commission’s most recent initiative in this 
field, the Communication of October 2011, which deals mainly with action 
on the home affairs front, was brought out by DG Justice. Conversely, when 
three weeks later the EMCDDA issued its 2011 Annual Report, this was 
welcomed on behalf of the Commission by Cecilia Malmström, the 
Commissioner for Home Affairs. 
146. This division of responsibilities was not thought by the Director of Europol 
to have caused significant problems, though he said: “When it was integrated 
in one Department, there was clearly greater potential for there to be a more 
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efficient prosecution of the policy.”171 We however believe that the way in 
which the responsibilities of the former DG JLS have been divided is likely 
over time to have an adverse effect on the work of the Commission and its 
officials in the field of drugs. By way of example, it has been agreed internally 
in the Commission that DG Justice and DG Home will both be represented 
on the EMCDDA Management Board. This needed an amendment to the 
Commission Decision of 26 October 2009 appointing members to the 
Management Board. At the meeting of the Management Board on 4–5 July 
2011 the Commission was represented by an official from DG Justice, with 
an official from DG SANCO (Health) as substitute, and an official from DG 
Home also attending, though not then as a full member. This is not an 
efficient use of Commission resources, nor can it help the work of the 
EMCDDA. 
147. It is not for us to make formal recommendations about the division of 
responsibilities within the Commission, but we believe that the 
current allocation of responsibilities must in the long term hamper 
the effective formulation and implementation of policies in the drugs 
field, and should be remedied. 
The Council Horizontal Drugs Group 
148. Coordination of EU drugs policy in the Council takes place through the 
Horizontal Drugs Group (HDG), whose functions in this respect were 
confirmed by the current Strategy.172 This Group, which meets monthly, 
consists of representatives from all the Member States, and also 
representatives from the Commission, Europol, the EMCDDA and others. 
The Group is used as a forum for the exchange of information, intelligence 
and best practice, and to talk about how Member States can work together to 
tackle the problems they are all facing. Ms Campbell told us that the HDG 
was particularly valuable in allowing members under the auspices of the 
HDG to discuss with colleagues from Latin America and the Caribbean how 
they might work together to tackle the drug flows coming from those areas.173 
149. The Home Office, which sends representatives to the HDG, regards it as a 
useful body.174 Professor MacGregor also thought that it had “played a very 
important role in co-ordinating between Member States”.175 But Mike Trace, 
whose experience at the UNODC might have given him some familiarity 
with administrative problems, was scathing about it, as indeed he was about 
the whole Brussels institutional setup. He thought the HDG was “much 
weaker now than it has been in previous years; there is not really much 
political strength and momentum there.”176 We do not know to what extent 
this criticism may be justified. We do however believe that for an EU Drugs 
Strategy to have any prospect of success, representation at the 
Horizontal Drugs Group should be at a senior level, with expertise to 
match, and with power to take decisions across the whole spectrum of 
interested Directorates and departments. 
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CHAPTER 8: A FUTURE EU DRUGS STRATEGY 
150. We have considered in Chapter 3 the current Strategy and Action Plan, and 
the reasons why in our view the Strategy has fallen short of achieving its two 
principal aims. In this chapter we look to the future. 
Does the EU need a Drugs Strategy at all? 
151. Should there continue to be a strategy at all, or is it enough that the EU should 
agree Action Plans? The views of Vice-President Reding, who as we have said is 
the Commissioner responsible for the EU Drugs Strategy, are illuminating and 
perhaps surprising. She described the Strategy to us as “a thing of the past” and 
“a nice piece of literature”.177 Later she said: “You know strategy is wishful 
thinking whereas an action plan or a communication for action is an action.”178 
152. This dismissive attitude is at variance with earlier views of the Commission 
(of which she herself was a member). In June 2009 the Commission thought 
there should be a new Strategy, and said as much in its Communication 
which was first draft of the Stockholm Programme:179 
BOX 8 
The Commission’s view on a new Drugs Strategy in June 2009 
The EU Drugs Strategy (2005–2012) advocates a global, balanced approach, 
based on the simultaneous reduction of supply and demand. This strategy 
will expire during the Stockholm Programme. It must be renewed on the 
basis of a detailed evaluation of the Drugs Action Plan 2009–2012, carried 
out by the Commission with the support of the European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol.180 
153. The Council agreed, and included this passage verbatim in the Stockholm 
Programme which was adopted by the European Council on 10–11 
December 2009.181 Four months later the Commission, in its Action Plan 
implementing the Stockholm Programme, included as one of the Actions: 
“Evaluation of the current EU Strategy on Drugs and EU Drugs Action Plan 
… and renewal of the Strategy and Action Plan”.182 
154. The current Strategy has proved helpful in encouraging countries to develop 
and revise their own national strategies, especially the newer Member States. 
We believe that there should continue to be an EU Drugs Strategy, albeit 
rather different from the current one. 
155. We do not share the view that a Drugs Strategy is of no value. We 
agree with the views of the Council, and concur in the views 
previously expressed by the Commission, that there should be a new 
Drugs Strategy 2013–2020. In formulating its action plans, the 
Commission needs the guidance of the Member States in showing the 
direction in which they wish to move. 
The Communication of October 2011 
156. On 25 October 2011 the Commission published a Communication “Towards 
a stronger European response to drugs”.183 It seems to be influenced by the 
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fact that the Treaty of Lisbon is now in force. The press release said: “With 
the Lisbon Treaty now in place, the EU has new tools to address the drugs 
scourge”, and the Communication itself states as much. 
BOX 9 
New powers under the Lisbon Treaty? 
The Lisbon Treaty defines drug trafficking as one of the “particularly 
serious crimes with a cross border dimension”, which justify the adoption of 
directives establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions. This is a major step forward that will 
make it possible for the EU to provide a bolder response, with stronger 
involvement of the European Parliament and of national Parliaments.184 
157. The Director of Europol told us: “… establishing minimum rules concerning 
the definition of criminal offences in this area and sanctions is a particular 
capability that has been established in the new Lisbon Treaty under Article 
83, and particularly in the field of illicit drug trafficking; we could establish 
this to ensure that there is a minimum level of effective deterrents to combat 
drug trafficking.”185 
158. The view that, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU 
has acquired “new tools to address the drugs scourge” is not one which we 
share. There are certainly procedural differences which may make it easier 
for legislation to be adopted. The collapsing of the first and third pillars 
means that legislation will now be by Directive made jointly by the 
Parliament and Council, and with QMV, rather than by a Framework 
Decision requiring unanimity, with only consultation of the Parliament. A 
Directive, unlike a Framework Decision, is justiciable by the European 
Court of Justice, and its implementation is potentially subject to infraction 
proceedings brought by the Commission. But as to the content of the 
measure, if what the Justice Commissioner means by a “bolder response” is 
that the EU can now include provisions in legislation which it could not 
previously include, we do not see that this is in fact the case. The 
substantive powers to legislate under Article 83 TFEU are no greater than 
those under Article 31 TEU. We note that any Directive adopted under 
Article 83 TFEU will not apply to the United Kingdom unless the 
Government opts in. 
159. The Conclusion of the Communication states that the Commission will 
present the following proposals for legislation: 
BOX 10 
Commission proposals for legislation, October 2011 
The Commission will present as legislative proposals: 
(1) A legislative package on drugs, proposing the revision of the 
Council Framework Decision on drug trafficking and the Council 
Decision on new psychoactive substances; 
(2) Legislative proposals on drug precursors; 
(3) Legislative proposals on the confiscation and recovery of criminal 
assets and on strengthening mutual recognition of freezing and 
confiscation orders; 
(4) New legislative measures to combat money laundering. 
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160. For the reasons we have given in Chapter 4, which to some extent are the 
reasons in the Commission’s own reports, we do not believe that revision of 
the Framework Decision on drug trafficking or of the Decision on new 
psychoactive substances is likely to bring much added value to the EU or its 
Member States. Legislative proposals on drug precursors and on money 
laundering are already commitments in the Stockholm Action Plan.186 We 
hope proposals will be brought forward on the confiscation and recovery of 
criminal assets since such measures could have real value. 
161. The timing of the Communication too is not easy to understand, given that 
the external evaluation of the 2005–2012 Strategy which the Commission 
had commissioned had not yet been completed, but was expected by the 
Commission to be completed within two months.187 The current Drugs 
Action Plan then still had over a year to run. By setting out then a list of 
actions planned over the following years, the Communication almost seems 
to be aimed at denying the need for a new Strategy and pre-empting a new 
Action Plan. 
162. We question whether the October 2011 Communication, which does 
little more than repeat the intention of the Commission to bring 
forward at a later date legislation which has already been announced, 
was well timed. 
163. In particular, for the reasons we have given, which include the 
reasons in the Commission’s own evaluations, we are not convinced 
that there is any benefit to be gained from new legislation on drug 
trafficking or on new psychoactive substances. 
Informed public debate 
164. In the introduction to this report, and again in giving our views on harm 
reduction and decriminalisation in Chapter 5, we stressed that any decisions 
on drugs strategy at national or international level should be preceded by an 
informed public debate and should draw upon practical experience. We have 
been struck by the paucity and poverty of public debate on these issues both 
in the United Kingdom and more widely. Views are often expressed with a 
totally inadequate understanding of the underlying evidence. Like the 
minister, we believe there is prejudice.188 We stress again that a sensible 
debate on decriminalisation must start with a proper definition of exactly 
what is in issue. 
165. The press have an important part to play, and have a duty to be objective and 
to base their views on the evidence. Some organs of the United Kingdom 
press are notoriously lacking in objectivity, and this is probably damaging not 
just the chances of drug addicts conquering their addiction, but also 
indirectly the constituency for whom they write. Baroness Meacher singled 
out the Daily Mail; Lord Mancroft told us that it had behaved “grossly 
irresponsibly”.189 
166. We believe that the formulation and adoption of a new Drugs Strategy 
by the EU offers a golden opportunity to widen the public debate, to 
consider as dispassionately as possible the different policies and 
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approaches, and thus to achieve a better consensus about the best way 
of proceeding. We urge the EU institutions, in particular the 
Commission and the Parliament, to make sure this takes place. 
What should the new Strategy say? 
167. Mike Trace, who from 2001 to 2003 was Chairman of the EMCDDA 
Management Board, told us that he had been involved at an early stage in 
setting the objectives of the current Strategy. He continued: “I think we 
should be at a stage now where we need to be brave enough to say we are 
working to the wrong objectives. In fact we are framing them wrong. There is 
nothing wrong with reducing supply or demand, but as overarching 
objectives for a Drugs Strategy I think we have framed them in the wrong 
way … supply and demand reductions are laudable goals and should be a key 
part of what we are trying to achieve, but because we have held them as what 
I would call the fetish of drug policy, we have misdirected a little bit of our 
thinking.”190 We agree. We have explained in Chapter 3 that, in our view, 
very broad brush objectives such as the reduction in supply and demand are 
not particularly meaningful. A new strategy needs to focus on clearer and 
more realistic objectives. 
168. The current Strategy has “two cross-cutting themes, international 
cooperation and research, information and evaluation”. We believe these 
should be retained in the next Strategy, but refined to give them a more 
practical and pragmatic focus, concentrating: 
• in the case of drug trafficking, on working to improve cooperation in the 
fight against drug trafficking and serious organised crime related to it, and 
to improve understanding of the effectiveness of initiatives against drug 
supply and their possible unintended consequences, including human 
rights implications; and 
• in the case of coordination, on enhancement of the work of the 
EMCDDA in collecting, analysing and disseminating the data vital to the 
Member States in comparing their own drugs strategies with those of 
other States. 
169. The current Strategy contains a single reference to harm reduction,191 but no 
suggestion that this is an area for EU action. Harm Reduction International 
suggested to us that: “harm reduction should be explicitly named in the new 
EU Drugs Strategy as an effective intervention to prevent HIV. Interventions 
such as needle and syringe exchange programmes (NSP) and opioid 
substitution therapy (OST) should be specified.”192 We agree. We believe the 
EU’s duty to “complement the Member States’ action in reducing drugs-
related health damage, including information and prevention” should include 
encouraging Member States, especially the newer members, to give a high 
priority to harm reduction measures. It should be recognised that health 
policy is as important as law enforcement policy in this field and that 
education also has a significant role to play. The EMCDDA could provide 
more information to show the effect of such measures. 
170. The Member States retain the right and duty to regulate the application of 
their own civil and criminal law and their health and education policies 
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within their own borders. This applies as much to drugs policy as to other 
matters. But the new Strategy, while making this clear, should also emphasise 
the need to promote an increased understanding of the public health 
implications that result from illegal drugs policies, and should stress the 
importance of evaluating interventions that are aimed at reducing adverse 
public health implications. 
Recommendations 
171. We believe the new EU Drugs Strategy should be better focused and, 
while respecting the present division of competences, should seek to 
give a useful sense of direction to national policies. 
172. Reduction in the demand for and supply of drugs are undeniably 
highly desirable ends, but they are too broad brush to be useful as a 
guide to EU policy formulation. They should therefore not be treated 
as the main objectives of the next EU Strategy. 
173. The Strategy should concentrate on the three areas where the EU can 
make a major contribution towards the work of the Member States. 
174. The first of these areas is coordination of the fight against drug 
trafficking. On the legislative front, the EU should better focus on 
money laundering and strengthen provisions on the seizure of the 
proceeds of crime. On the operational side, through Europol and 
other agencies, it can directly contribute to the fight against drug 
trafficking. 
175. The Strategy should make clear that anti-trafficking measures must 
guard against simply displacing the problem to new areas not 
previously affected, and must have regard to the human rights of 
those involved. 
176. Secondly, the Strategy should concentrate on improvement of the 
collection, analysis, evaluation and distribution of information so that 
Member States, while retaining the freedom to formulate their own 
policies, can learn from each other’s experiences and benefit from 
each other’s research. 
177. Finally, the new Strategy should use the EU’s public health 
obligations to further the inclusion of harm reduction measures in the 
national policies of the Member States. 
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
EU involvement in drugs policies 
178. We agree with our witnesses that the health aspects, and most other aspects, 
of drugs policies should remain within the competence of the Member 
States. The role of the EU should continue to be to complement, and where 
possible to strengthen and add value to, the actions of Member States. 
(paragraph 26) 
179. Even if this were not our view, the practical difficulties of obtaining 
agreement to treaty change and the reluctance of many Member States to 
surrender their freedom of action on issues such as decriminalisation mean 
that this is the only realistic position for the foreseeable future. 
(paragraph 27) 
180. We welcome this instance of the practical application by the EU of the 
principle of subsidiarity. (paragraph 28) 
The position on the ground 
181. The EU Drugs Strategy and national drugs strategies should involve and 
encourage direct cooperation between cities, local authorities and 
organisations across national boundaries, and where possible promote such 
activities. (paragraph 40) 
The EU Drugs Strategy 2005–2012 
182. Like the majority of our witnesses, we believe that the 2005–2012 Strategy 
has been of some value despite the fact that neither of its two main policy 
objectives has been achieved. Very broad brush objectives such as these are 
not particularly meaningful. The next Strategy needs a more focused 
direction. (paragraph 57) 
The fight against drug trafficking 
183. We believe that, when measures against drug trafficking are being planned, 
more attention must be paid to the displacement effect, to other possible 
unintended consequences, and to the impact of the measures on those not 
previously involved. (paragraph 68) 
184. When the EU provides assistance to third countries in anti-trafficking 
measures, it must make clear that the resources are to be used in a way 
compatible with the human rights of those involved. It should take steps to 
monitor the programmes it supports and to ensure that they do not result in 
human rights violations, in particular the application of the death penalty. 
(paragraph 69) 
Europol 
185. The Government should fully support the Director of Europol in seeking to 
improve the use of Europol’s unique databases and other facilities, and 
should urge other governments to do the same. (paragraph 72) 
Money laundering and seizure of the proceeds of crime 
186. Yet again, we urge the Government to sign and ratify the Warsaw 
Convention on Money Laundering without further delay. (paragraph 77) 
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EU development policy 
187. We recommend that the EU and its Member States give added emphasis in 
their development policies to well focused projects for assisting countries to 
diversify their agricultural economies and stop growing illegal drugs. 
(paragraph 81) 
Minimum penalties for trafficking 
188. We remain unconvinced by the case for replacing the Framework Decision 
on minimum penalties for trafficking by a Directive, as suggested by the 
Commission in its October 2011 Communication, unless and until it can be 
shown that a Directive will be effective and will bring added value to this area 
of national drug policy making. (paragraph 85) 
New psychoactive substances 
189. We endorse the importance of the EU’s “early warning system” which exists 
to facilitate the exchange of information on newly developed psychoactive 
substances within the Member States and beyond. (paragraph 94) 
190. However the risk assessment and banning procedure of the 2005 Council 
Decision is so cumbersome that we doubt whether it can be cured by 
amendment. We believe that decisions about banning such substances are, in 
most cases, best left to individual Member States. (paragraph 95) 
191. There is a strong case for the use in the United Kingdom, and indeed 
throughout the EU, of analogue legislation which allows drugs with similar 
molecular structures and similar effects to be banned as a group. 
(paragraph 96) 
192. We support the exploration of alternatives to banning new psychoactive 
substances, such as placing them within regulated markets similar to those 
that already exist for alcohol and tobacco, which attempt to control use 
through education and treatment rather than criminalisation. (paragraph 97) 
Harm reduction and decriminalisation 
193. We were impressed by the evidence from Portugal on the effectiveness of 
their public health orientated national drug strategy. Harm reduction and 
public health policies are increasingly being adopted internationally, 
nationally and locally. We believe Member States should study each other’s 
policies and be more willing to learn from one another, and we recommend 
that the EU should promote and prioritise the evaluation of the effectiveness 
of these strategies. (paragraph 117) 
194. We take no position on whether in this country a change towards a policy of 
decriminalisation would be beneficial, since this is outside our remit, but we 
believe the debate would benefit from a clearer understanding of precisely 
what policy changes would be involved, and a closer study of the experience 
of other countries, particularly other Member States. (paragraph 118) 
The European Monitoring Centre 
195. We welcome and endorse the universally high esteem in which the 
EMCDDA is held. We believe it should continue to work towards common 
definitions and a common data collection practice, and should encourage 
Member States to do likewise. We urge the Government to do all it can to 
assist in this. (paragraph 140) 
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196. We agree that the EMCDDA should play no part in grading the success or 
failure of the policies of the different Member States. However we believe 
that the agency, without compromising its policy neutrality, could do more to 
indicate when the evidence points to a particular policy having been 
successful. (paragraph 141) 
197. During the current negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 
2014–2020, and during the annual budgetary negotiations, the Government 
should ensure that the resources of the EMCDDA are at least retained at 
their current level in real terms. (paragraph 142) 
Statistics 
198. We recommend that a major effort should be made in the context of 
discussion of the next EU strategy to improve the quality and comparability 
of national statistics. This may require some change in the way that the 
United Kingdom and other Member States collect data, but we believe that 
the establishment of more consistent statistics would make the work of the 
EMCDDA even more valuable than it now is, and would amply repay the 
investment involved. (paragraph 130) 
199. The Government should seek to ensure that the reporting of drug-related 
deaths is consistent across the United Kingdom, so that reports refer to the 
year of death and not to the year of registration of death. (paragraph 132) 
Drug supply evaluation 
200. There need to be thorough evaluations of measures to disrupt drug supply 
with a view to making them more effective and better focused, to 
determining their added value, and fully to understand their unintended 
consequences. The Government should support the efforts of the EMCDDA 
to take forward their plans on supply side indicators, and should persuade 
the Commission and other Member States to do likewise. (paragraph 135) 
Research 
201. We hope that if viable research projects can be brought forward, ways will be 
found of financing them through the EU research programmes. This will 
help to ensure that future policies are evidence-based, since one of the 
weaknesses until now has been the lack of sufficient evidence. 
(paragraph 138) 
Institutional questions 
202. It is not for us to make formal recommendations about the division of 
responsibilities within the Commission, but we believe that the current 
allocation of responsibilities between the Justice and Home Affairs 
Directorates must in the long term hamper the effective formulation and 
implementation of policies in the drugs field, and should be remedied. 
(paragraph 147) 
203. For an EU Drugs Strategy to have any prospect of success, representation at 
the Horizontal Drugs Group should be at a senior level, with expertise to 
match, and with power to take decisions across the whole spectrum of 
interested Directorates and departments. (paragraph 149) 
A new EU Drugs Strategy 
204. We do not share the view that a Drugs Strategy is of no value. We agree with 
the views of the Council, and concur in the views previously expressed by the 
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Commission, that there should be a new Drugs Strategy 2013–2020. In 
formulating its action plans, the Commission needs the guidance of the 
Member States in showing the direction in which they wish to move. 
(paragraph 155) 
205. We question whether the October 2011 Communication, which does little 
more than repeat the intention of the Commission to bring forward at a later 
date legislation which has already been announced, was well timed. 
(paragraph 162) 
206. In particular, for the reasons we have given, which include the reasons in the 
Commission’s own evaluations, we are not convinced that there is any 
benefit to be gained from new legislation on drug trafficking or on new 
psychoactive substances. (paragraph 163) 
207. We believe that the formulation and adoption of a new Drugs Strategy by the 
EU offers a golden opportunity to widen the public debate, to consider as 
dispassionately as possible the different policies and approaches, and thus to 
achieve a better consensus about the best way of proceeding. We urge the 
EU institutions, in particular the Commission and the Parliament, to make 
sure this takes place. (paragraph 166) 
What the new Strategy should say 
208. We believe the new EU Drugs Strategy should be better focused and, while 
respecting the present division of competences, should seek to give a useful 
sense of direction to national policies. (paragraph 171) 
209. Reduction in the demand for and supply of drugs are undeniably highly 
desirable ends, but they are too broad brush to be useful as a guide to EU 
policy formulation. They should therefore not be treated as the main 
objectives of the next EU Strategy. (paragraph 172) 
210. The Strategy should concentrate on the three areas where the EU can make a 
major contribution towards the work of the Member States. (paragraph 173) 
211. The first of these areas is coordination of the fight against drug trafficking. 
On the legislative front, the EU should better focus on money laundering and 
strengthen provisions on the seizure of the proceeds of crime. On the 
operational side, through Europol and other agencies, it can directly 
contribute to the fight against drug trafficking. (paragraph 174) 
212. The Strategy should make clear that anti-trafficking measures must guard 
against simply displacing the problem to new areas not previously affected, 
and must have regard to the human rights of those involved. (paragraph 175) 
213. Secondly, the Strategy should concentrate on improvement of the collection, 
analysis, evaluation and distribution of information so that Member States, 
while retaining the freedom to formulate their own policies, can learn from 
each other’s experiences and benefit from each other’s research. 
(paragraph 176) 
214. Finally, the new Strategy should use the EU’s public health obligations to 
further the inclusion of harm reduction measures in the national policies of 
the Member States. (paragraph 177) 
Conclusion 
215. We make this report to the House for debate. (paragraph 8) 
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    (UNODC) 
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* QQ 178–207  Baroness Meacher 
** QQ 178–207  Lord Ramsbotham 
** QQ 208–238  Vice-President Viviane Reding, Commissioner for 
    Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship 
**  QQ 239–257  José Sócrates, former Prime Minister of Portugal 
** QQ 258–294  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
    Addiction (EMCDDA) 
** QQ 295–311  João Castel-Branco Goulão, Director of Instituto da 
    Droga e da Toxicodependência, the Portuguese  
    national drugs agency, part of the Ministry of Health 
* QQ312–361  Lord Henley, Minister of State for Crime Prevention 
    and Anti-Social Behaviour Reduction, Home Office 
 
Alphabetical list of all witnesses 
* All Party Parliamentary Group on Drug Policy Reform (QQ 178–207) 
* Rev Eric Blakebrough 
** Antonio Maria Costa, Former Under-Secretary General of the United
 Nations and Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and
 Crime (UNODC) (QQ 155–177) 
** European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)
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* Europol (QQ 118–154) 
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** João Castel-Branco Goulão, Director of Instituto da Droga e da
 Toxicodependência, the Portuguese national drugs agency, part of the
 Ministry of Health (QQ 295–311) 
 Harm Reduction International 
* Lord Henley, Minister of State for Crime Prevention and Anti-Social
 Behaviour Reduction, Home Office (QQ 312–361) 
* Home Office (QQ 25–59, Ms Campbell and Ms Haddad) 
 Dr Axel Klein, Centre for Health Studies, University of Kent 
** Professor Susanne MacGregor, London School of Hygiene and Tropical
 Medicine (QQ 1–24) 
** Lord Mancroft (QQ 178–207) 
* Baroness Meacher (QQ 178–207) 
** Lord Ramsbotham (QQ 178–207) 
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APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE 
The Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Lords Select Committee on 
the European Union, chaired by Lord Hannay of Chiswick, is conducting an 
inquiry into the EU Drugs Strategy. The Committee seeks evidence from anyone 
with an interest. 
Written evidence is sought by 26 August 2011. Public hearings of oral evidence 
will be held from September to November 2011. The Committee aims to report to 
the House, with recommendations, in February 2012. The report will receive a 
response from the Government, and may be debated in the House. 
The inquiry takes place at the time of the gestation of the next (2013–2020) Drugs 
Strategy which will replace the current (2005–2012) Strategy. The aim of the 
inquiry is to consider how successful the current Strategy and the associated Drugs 
Action Plan have been in their stated aims, and in the light of this assessment to 
make suggestions about the content of the next Strategy and how it might be made 
more effective. 
Operational work on combating drug trafficking and drug use is the responsibility 
of the Member States, and the principle of subsidiarity means that this is likely to 
remain the position. The Member States, and the EU, operate in the context of 
global cooperation on the drug problem, including a number of UN agreements to 
which the Member States are party (and in some cases the EU as such is also a 
signatory). The role of the EU is primarily to coordinate the work of the Member 
States in reducing demand and supply, to promote international cooperation, and 
to foster the role of research and the dissemination of information. The inquiry 
will consider whether this is the right role, whether it could be enhanced, and 
whether it could be performed more effectively. 
The Committee seeks evidence on any aspect of this topic, and particularly on the 
following questions: 
• The success or otherwise of the existing EU Drugs Strategy and Action 
Plan; 
• The success or otherwise of EU and international collaboration among 
law enforcement agencies in disrupting trafficking routes; 
• Whether further harmonisation of drugs policy is feasible or desirable at 
the EU level; 
• The external dimension of EU policy in relation to candidate countries, 
and cooperation with third countries; 
• The multilateral dimension, including the UN Conventions; 
• The role of the EU, and in particular the EMCDDA, in collating data, 
funding research and development projects, and sharing instances of best 
practice in order to increase understanding of the problems and ways to 
tackle them; 
• The role of the EU in promoting and improving the commitment of 
individual Member States to the principle of harm reduction; 
• The desirability of increased promotion by the EU of drugs policy at the 
local level; 
• The role of the EU in promoting evidence based policy in the field of 
illicit drugs; 
• Licensing issues and the designation of illegal or controlled drugs. 
You need not address all these questions. 
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The Committee is a Sub-Committee of the Select Committee on the European 
Union, whose terms of reference are “to consider European Union documents … 
and other matters relating to the European Union”. The inquiry will not therefore 
be looking in depth at the domestic drugs policies of States—whether the United 
Kingdom, other Member States or non-Member States—but will be considering 
them only as part of the context within which the EU operates. Detailed 
consideration of national drugs policies is outside the scope of the inquiry. 
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APPENDIX 4: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACMD  Advisory Council on Misuse of Drugs 
AFSJ   Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
APPGDM  All Party Parliamentary Group on Drug Misuse 
APPGDPR  All Party Parliamentary Group for Drug Policy Reform 
ATS   Amphetamine-type stimulants 
BZP   1-benzylpiperazine 
CELAD  Comité Européen pour la Lutte Anti-drogue 
CECLAD-M  Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti-drogue en  
   Méditerranée 
CFR   (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights 
CND   Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
COSI   Coopération opérationnelle en matière de sécurité intérieure. 
   The French acronym for the Standing Committee on  
   Operational Cooperation on Internal Security, constituted 
   under Article 71 TFEU. 
CSES   Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services 
DG HOME  Commission Directorate-General for Home Affairs 
DG JUSTICE Commission Directorate-General for Justice 
DAP   Drugs Action Plan 
EMCDDA  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
EC   European Community 
ECAD  European Cities against Drugs 
ECDP  European Cities on Drug Policy (originally Amsterdam, 
   Frankfurt, Hamburg and Zurich) 
ECHR  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
   and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
   Human Rights) 
EDF   European Development Fund 
EEA   European Economic Area 
EEG   (UN) Eastern European Group 
EJN   European Judicial Network 
ENCOD  European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies 
EPCIDT  European Pact to Combat International Drug Trafficking 
ERA-NET  European research area network 
ESPAD  European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs 
EU   European Union 
Europad  European Opiate Addiction Treatment Association 
Europol  European Police Office 
FP7   The EU Seventh Research Framework Programme 
Frontex  European agency for the management of operational  
   cooperation at the external borders 
GRULAC  (UN) Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries 
HDG   Horizontal Drugs Group 
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HIV   Human immunodeficiency virus 
HONLEA  Heads of National Law Enforcement Agencies 
IDU   Intravenous drug use 
ILO   International Labour Organisation 
INCB   International Narcotics Control Board 
IPPR   (UK) Institute for Public Policy Research 
JHA   Justice and Home Affairs 
JLS   Justice, Liberté, Sécurité: the French acronym for the former 
   Commission Directorate-General for Freedom, Security and 
   Justice 
LIBE   European Parliament Committee on Liberty, Justice and 
   Home Affairs 
MAOC—N  Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre—Narcotics 
MDMA  Ecstasy 
NPS   Novel psychoactive substances, “legal highs” 
OAS   Oranization of American States 
OCTA  Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PDU   Problem drug user 
REITOX  Réseau Européen d’Information sur les Drogues et les  
   Toxicomanies (European Information Network on Drugs and 
   Drug Addiction) 
SCDEA  Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency 
SECI   South-east European Cooperation Initiative 
SOCA  Serious Organised Crime Agency 
STR   Suspicious transaction report 
TAXUD  Commission Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs 
   Union 
TEC   Treaty establishing the European Community 
TEU   Treaty on European Union 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UKREP  The Brussels office of the United Kingdom Permanent  
   Representative to the EU 
UN   United Nations 
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
WEOG  (UN) Western European and Others Group 
WHO   World Health Organisation 
